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Italian precedent for the armistice negotiations with Romania in 1944

One of the most significant events in laying the foundations of the post-war socialist system in Romania was the Allied signing of the Armistice with Badoglio's government in Italy in September 1943. By recognizing Badoglio's government, the Soviets made a political concession to the Western Allies, leaving one of the strongest communist parties out of the future power structure, which resulted in ceding the Balkans (with the exception of Greece) to the Soviets¹. The signing of that document was important not only for Romania, but also for other German allies such as Hungary and Bulgaria². In that sense, the signing of the Armistice with the mentioned German allies also concerned Yugoslavia, and indirectly the post-war unfolding of events in the Balkans and the Mediterranean³.

From the Soviet point of view, Romania was a territory through which the Red Army could reach the warm seas by land through the south of Romania and further through Bulgaria. On the other hand, through central and northern Romania, the possibility was opened to reach Austria via Hungary and, in geostrategic terms,

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¹ In 1945, the Italian party had 1,770,000 members. Arhiv Jugoslavije (hereinafter: AJ), CKSKJ, IX, 48/XIII-95, *Taktika KP, SP i SDP Italije 1921-1958. Komunistička partija*; Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter FRUS), Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (1945), American Policy Toward Spheres of Influence. Summary, p. 106.

² On the course of negotiations with Bulgaria, see in detail in: National Archives and Record Administration (hereinafter: ANRA), Series: Message Files, 1942-1945, Collectio: Map Room Papers (Roosvelt Administration), 1942-1945, 7 April 1944; *Дипломатически документи по участието на България във Втора световна война. Дневници на Министерство на външните работи в правителствата на Георги Кьоосеиванов, проф. Богдан Филов, Добри Божилов, Иван Багрянов, Константин Муравиев (1939-1944)*, съставители Билярски Цочо, Гезенко Иванка, София 2006, с. 436-437; FRUS, Application of the Principle of Unconditional Surrender to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Volume I, 1944, p. 589.

³ The fact that Romania was also seen as part of the Mediterranean in the geopolitical plans of the Western Allies can be evidenced by a series of American documents, in which it was recorded that Stalin was angry when the Anglo-American command for the Mediterranean made any moves in Romania. The supreme commander of the Mediterranean considered that Romania and Bulgaria were in his sphere of responsibility: Elizabet Barker, *Britanska politika na Balkanu u II svijetском ratu*, Ljubljana, 1978, p. 125.

to the very important Alpe-Adria region⁴. Hence, the Soviet interest was to keep Romania firmly under control. On the other hand, for the same geopolitical and strategic reasons, it was in the interest of the Western allies that Italy be firmly under their control.

The way in which the Western allies in Italy carried out an unconditional surrender in 1943 and signed the Armistice became the model for the truce with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in the autumn of 1944⁵. The text of the Armistice was the basic document from which the post-war system in Romania developed⁶. Based on it, the institution of the Allied Occupation Power, the Allied Control Commission, was organized in Bucharest with executive powers (“The Allied Control Commission established in accordance with article 18 of the agreement covering an armistice shall be charged with the control of the faithful execution of the terms of the armistice. The Romanian Government and its bodies shall be obliged to carry out all directions of the Allied Control Commission arising from the armistice agreement. The Allied Control Commission shall set up specific organs or sections charged with the execution of the various functions. Furthermore, the Control Commission may have its offices in various localities of Romania. The Allied Control Commission shall have its real seat in Bucharest”)⁷. Within it, the Soviet Union, according to the Allied Agreement, was given an advantage in the implementation of the provisions of the Armistice, just as in the Italian Allied Control Commission, where the advantage belonged to the Anglo-Americans (“We feel that the draft now includes substantially all the points covered in the Department’s instructions received to date and that through establishment of the control commission paralleling the Italian procedure points on which we may not be fully satisfied or new subjects can be dealt with”)⁸. Hence, the “Italian case” and the actions of the Anglo-American representatives in the Italian Allied Control Commission served the Soviets as a “corrective” (“The General stated that it was the intention that the ACC in Romania should be planned on the same pattern as the ACC in Italy. In Italy the executive role belongs to the Anglo-American Command. Soviet representatives do not take part in the

⁴ Minutes from the Joint Session of the NKOJ and Representatives of the Royal Government in London, held on August 19, 1944. *Zapisnici NKOJ-a i privremene vlade DFJ 1943-1945*, ur: Petranović Branko, Marković Ljiljana, Beograd 1991, s. 32.

⁵ Quinlan, D. Paul, *Ciocnire deasupra României. Politica anglo-americană față de România 1938-1947*, Iași, 1995, p. 83.

⁶ Др Оливера Драгишић, *Конституисање комунистичке власти на Балкану после другог светског рата: компаративна анализа структуре власти у Југославији, Бугарској и Румунији 1944-1947* (doctoral thesis, 2018), p. 73-131.

⁷ FRUS, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 8, 1944, p. 230.

⁸ FRUS, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 5, 1944, p. 220; FRUS, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 6, 1944, p. 223; Hlihor, Constantin, *Rolul armatei sovietice de ocupație în schimbarea regimului politic din România, în 6 martie 1945. Începuturile comunizării României*, București, 1995, p. 12.

administration of the Departments with the exception of the Department dealing with tracing Allied citizens. Soviet representative has the right to be informed of the work of the ACC and hands his suggestions to the deputy chairman”⁹).

With the military advance of the Red Army towards the borders of Romania, the perception of Romania as a purely Soviet “spoils of war” matured in Moscow. The Soviet understanding of its future influence in Romania was based on Stalin’s belief that the USSR in Romania should organize its administration in the same way that the Western Allies organized their administration in Italy – as a kind of reciprocity between them. In February 1944, it was already certain that the Allies in occupied Romania would be represented by the Soviets. In this way, a balance was established between the Allies: Italy, because of its position in the Mediterranean, represented a country of high strategic importance to the Western Allies. As such, Italy was a counterpart to the “belt” of countries comprising Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which, similar to Italy’s importance in Anglo-American plans, was of high importance in Soviet geopolitical plans¹⁰. Italy, on the one hand, and Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, on the other, strategically provided the Allies with a path to Central Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, respectively¹¹.

In March 1944, the American administration was informed of the Soviet expectation that the future Allied occupation administration in Romania should be established according to the Italian model. This model implied a reciprocal relationship: while in Italy power was practically held by the Americans, and the USSR was present in the Allied Control Commission through its representatives, in Romania the executive power would have the Soviets, and the Americans, to the extent that the Soviets were present in Italy SKK, were present in the Romanian Allied Control Commission¹². Such a model was envisaged and implemented in Bulgaria as well. The Soviets had executive power in Romania from the establishment of the Allied Control Commission until the signing of the peace treaty, which meant from October 1944 to the end of 1947.

In order to be able to use the executive power for its own benefit, the USSR set the preparations for building power in Romania earlier, from the *coup*

⁹ FRUS, The American Representative in Romania (Berry) to the Secretary of State, Bucharest, December 12, 1944, p. 281.

¹⁰ FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (1945), Briefing Book Paper American Position on Allied Control Commission in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, p. 238; FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (1945), Briefing Book Paper American Position on Allied Control Commission in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, p. 238.

¹¹ Reciprocity was obvious already in January 1945, as can be seen from a Kennan’s report from Moscow in which he wrote that the position of the American and British representatives in the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria and Romania in Moscow was understood in relation to the position of the Soviet representatives in the Allied Control Commission in Italy. FRUS, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, January 30, 1945, p. 151.

¹² FRUS, Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, December 10, 1945, p. 407.

d'etat on August 23, until the establishment of the Allied Control Commission in mid-October 1944. For that, they needed British cooperation, which, as the American ambassador to Turkey noted, they got¹³.

In the spring of 1944, the American administration left it to Britain to independently regulate its interests in Europe and harmonize them with the interests of the USSR. This resulted in the June British-Soviet agreement “Romania for Greece”¹⁴, which provided that Romania would be left to the Soviets after the war, and Greece to Britain. This was followed by the “Bulgaria for Greece” agreement, under which Britain and Bulgaria renounced in favor of the Soviets, provided that the Soviets did not interfere in Greece¹⁵. In other words, about the fact that Romania will belong to the Soviets after the war, first America and the USSR agreed, and then Britain and the USSR. That the great powers agreed in the spring of 1944 on future spheres of influence so that Romania would belong to the Soviets is also indirectly testified by the observation of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Menenmendzoglu¹⁶. He warned, among other things, that one of the most important indicators of the future redistribution of spheres of influence among the allies was that the USSR in Italy, which had the strongest communist party, recognized Badoglio's government in which there were no communists.

The Allied treaties were corrupted by Roosevelt's belief that the post-war world could only be governed by the agreed policy of the victorious powers. The post-war division of the world into spheres of influence was unacceptable to him. That is why Roosevelt opposed any attempt by the British and the Soviets to form spheres of influence. Hence, the US administration considered the spring agreements “Romania for Greece” and “Bulgaria for Greece” to be temporary war tactics and limited their duration to three months¹⁷. That deadline expired in September, when Romania was the most vulnerable – between the coup and the signing of the Armistice. The American administration expected Britain and the USSR to reconcile their interests from September 1944, and that the agreements reached between them would be preparatory agreements for a large conference such as the one in Yalta¹⁸. Contrary to American expectations, the British and the Soviets regulated their relations, but by confirming not only the spring agreements

¹³ *Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu 1943-1945. Dokumenti*, Petranović Branko, Lubljana 1981, p. 317-319 (Ankara 5.4.1944. Ilija Šumenković's letter to B. Purić on the British and Soviets spheres of influences in the Balkans).

¹⁴ Quinlan, D. Paul, *op. cit.*, p. 93; FRUS, The Ambassador in turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Ankara, September, 1944, p. 227.

¹⁵ Vesselin Dimitrov, *Stalin's Cold War, Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and Communism in Bulgaria*, New York, 2008, p. 88.

¹⁶ Milan Ristović, *Turska osmatračnica. Jugoslovensko-turski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu i njihov balkanski kontekst*, Beograd, 2013, p. 187.

¹⁷ FRUS, vol. I, The Secretary of State to Certain American Officers, June 22, 1945, p. 610-612; C. L. Sulzberger, *Sedam kontinenata i četrdeset godina. Sažetak memoara*, Zagreb, 1977, p. 52-53.

¹⁸ Deletant, Dennis, *British Policy towards Romania: 23. August 1944 – 6. March 1945*, in *6 Martie 1945...*, p. 102-114.

“Romania and Bulgaria for Greece” with the October percentage division, but also thinking about the post-war division of territories into spheres of influence. The signing of the Armistice in Moscow was prolonged by the British filing of amendments to the text, which reached a degree of opposite meaning from the one with which the allies took Romania out of the war on the side of the victors.

The conditions under which Romania was handed over to the occupying authorities of the Allies, i. e. the Soviets, were as follows: the signatory of the surrender had to be the supreme military commander and someone from the civilian government (“The instrument providing for the termination of hostilities should be signed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the High Command of the Romanian Armed Forces or his representative, and, if possible, by an authorized civilian official representing the Romanian Government”¹⁹); surrender was defined as unconditional (“The Romanian High Command should be required to acknowledge the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Romania’s armed forces and to agree to submit to such terms and faithfully execute such duties as may be imposed upon them by the occupation authorities”²⁰); a military government was envisaged during the occupation (“Romania should be obligated to cooperate with the submit to the regulations and orders of such enforcement agencies as the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces may establish for the military government of occupied Romania and for the execution of the surrender terms”²¹); the withdrawal of the Romanian army from the territory it did not hold before June 21, 1941 (from Bukovina and Bessarabia) was also planned (“Without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims, Romanian armed forces should be withdrawn from all areas other than territory held by Romania on June 21, 1941, their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the occupation authorities. Romanian officials in such areas, except those whose continued presence is desired by the occupation authorities, should likewise be withdrawn. Individuals or units in such areas may be designated to be held as prisoners of war”²²); the demobilization of Romanian land, air, naval, river and “quasi-police” forces is envisaged (“Romanian land, sea and air forces, including armed quasi-police forces, but excluding such civil police as may be approved by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, should be completely demobilized.

Demobilization should be carried out under the direction of the occupation authorities with as much consideration for internal order and social stability as is consistent with military security. All Romanian forces, including para-military forces equipped with weapons, should be disarmed immediately under the direction

¹⁹ FRUS, The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington, February 2, 1944, p. 137.

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Ibidem.

of the occupation authorities. The movement and location of Romanian troops within Romania, pending demobilization, should be subject to the direction of the occupation authorities. A permanent audit and inspection system should be established and maintained, and there should be continuous and unhampered inspection by the occupation authorities of all areas and installations which are or might be used for the production of war materials, for the conduct of military staff work, of for military training”²³); the civilian police would submit to the commander of the Soviet forces; it was agreed to hand over war material and weapons to the Allies; America, Britain and the USSR would, on behalf of the United Nations, occupy every part of Romania, even those parts that were in dispute between neighbors, while Bucharest would be only temporarily occupied, but without a time limit for how long the occupation would last (“The United States, United Kingdom, and The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of the United Nations, should have the right to occupy with any forces at their disposal and in any way they deem necessary, and to utilize in any way they deem appropriate, any or all parts of Romanian territory heretofore acknowledged to be under Romanian sovereignty or in dispute as to such sovereignty, and to exercise throughout such territory the legal rights of an occupying power as well as the other rights arising under the instrument of surrender. For political purposes Bucharest and other principal cities to be designated should be occupied, at least temporarily. No time limit for the period of general occupation should be stated”²⁴).

Archives, communications, transport, electricity, press, radio, post office, merchant ships and all other vessels, the education system and cultural agencies are placed under the control of the occupying authorities – meaning the Council (“Romania should be required to preserve and make available to the occupation authorities all public and private archives, archival staffs, records, files, documents and information as those authorities may require (...); Romania should be required to place at the disposal of the occupation authorities, for such aid and disposition as they may determine, all facilities for communication and transportation, and for the generation, transmission and distribution of power, including establishments for the manufacture and repair of such facilities. It should be required to protect and maintain as efficiently as possible all such facilities and to inform the occupation authorities concerning them (...); The utilization of press, radio, mail, and similar instruments of dissemination of information should be made subject to such controls and supervision as may be imposed by occupation forces in the interests of military security and peace and order (...); All merchant tonnage, including yachts and miscellaneous craft, wherever located, of Romanian ownership or operated under or subject to Romanian control (including ships option, in which case such option shall be promptly exercised and the return of the vessels facilitated by the

²³ Ibidem, p. 138.

²⁴ Ibidem.

Romanian Government), shall be immediately turned over to the occupation authorities acting prejudice to the ultimate disposition of such vessels [...]”²⁵); Romania would commit itself to protecting foreign nationals and their property and to prosecuting war criminals (“Romania should be obligated to hold in custody and to deliver to the occupation authorities all persons of Romanian nationality and other persons within Romania or subject to Romanian jurisdiction charged with having committed war crimes. Such persons should be delivered whether they are specified by name or by the rank, office of employment which they held in the Romanian armed forces, the Romanian Government or other Romanian organization and agencies at the time of the alleged crime. Romania should be required to cooperate in the trial and punishment of the persons delivered under this obligation and any persons of like category held by the United Nations as prisoners of war at the time of the surrender of Romania through the production of records, the collection of evidence, the enactment of legislation, and any steps necessary to facilitate such trial and punishment”²⁶); entry and exit from Romania would not be possible without the permission of the occupying authorities (“No person should be permitted to leave or enter Romania without authorization of the occupation authorities. Romania should be obligated to deliver upon demand persons who are nationals of any state at war with any of the United Nations or the nationals of countries occupied by such belligerent states”²⁷); at the request of the occupiers, Romania would have to control domestic and foreign trade, exchange, finances (“Romania should be obligated to take such measures as the occupation authorities may require to control both foreign and domestic commerce, exchange, finance and all other types of economic activity carried on in Romania or by Romanian nationals”²⁸).

Romania should not allow the removal of property from its territory, nor its citizens, nor foreign nationals (“Romania should be required not to dispose or allow the disposal of property outside its territory, whether of the Romanian State, of political subdivisions thereof, of Romanian public or private institutions or organizations, or of persons resident in Romania, except with the permission of the occupation authorities”²⁹); Romania was obliged to pay reparations (“Romania should be obligated to make such reparation and restitution as the United Nations may require and to comply with such directions as may from time to time be prescribed by the occupation authorities acting in the interests of the United Nations”³⁰); all undesirable organizations that could threaten the occupying power will be disbanded, but parts of these organizations can be transformed and gain a new economic or social function in the new system of government (“All Romanian

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Ibidem.

organizations which may be regarded as a treat to the security of the occupation forces or to international peace, should be disbanded"³¹); all discriminatory laws must be repealed ("All Romanian laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be suspended or repealed as directed by the occupation authorities"³²); it was obligatory to maintain law and order; Romania would participate in the restoration of its economic system in a manner required of it by the United Nations; the costs of the occupation are borne by Romania, etc.³³.

From the above points, it can be seen how much power the Soviet Union practically gained over Romania in agreement with the other two allies. The power gained was equivalent to the positions that the Western allies had in Italy³⁴. The guarantor of reciprocity was hidden in the fact that in the event of a breach of the agreement in Italy, the USSR could activate the largest communist party of 270,000 members at that time. On the other hand, the most important Romanian party, the People's Peasant Party, led by Iuliu Maniu, was completely under the control of the British intelligence services and British finances³⁵. Viewed from the perspective of 1947, when the socialist regime was finally implemented in Romania, the terms of the Armistice (derived from the Italian case) can be considered the basis from which the socialist system in Romania was derived (for instance: "From the military point of view, the present Romanian situation is analogous to the Italian situation at the time of her surrender to the British and ourselves. Since Russian participation in Italian operations was impracticable, the western Allies handled the matter of Italian surrender to the three principal Allies and Russian participation in the Italian situation has been limited to representation on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy and the Allied Control Commission").

However, we must not neglect the extremely important period that preceded the beginning of the work of the Allied Control Commission. It was a transitional period from the old to the future system of government, between August 23 and October 18, 1944. During it, the Soviets, thanks to the vacuum, with the tacit consent of the Western Allies, did everything they could not, given the Western Allies, from the beginning of the work of the Allied Control Commission. Many of the moves they made in Romania would not be in line with the provisions of the Armistice, so they were implemented before the Armistice came into force³⁶.

³¹ Ibidem.

³² Ibidem.

³³ FRUS, January 13, The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Provisions for Imposition Upon Romania at Time of Surrender, Washington, February 2, 1944, 136-142.

³⁴ Compare the armistice agreements signed by the Allies with Italy (September 3, 1943) and Romania (September 12, 1944). The text of the armistice with Italy: <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/italy01.asp>; The text of the armistice with Romania: <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/Romania.asp>

³⁵ Marko Pivac, *Rad britanske tajne službe u Jugoslaviji u predvečerje Aprilskog rata 1941*, in "Istorija 20. veka", 2010/3, Beograd, 2010, p. 192-212.

³⁶ AJ, CK SKJ (507), IX, 107/I-10, State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Romania, June 1956.

Therefore, for the observers from Turkey who were interested in the Romanian case for strategic reasons, the Soviet behavior in Romania during September was illogical. It seemed that the Soviets were occupying Romania, which did not make sense because they had just expelled the German occupiers.

Observers at the time could not have known that Soviet behavior in Romania was not mere arbitrariness, but stemmed from allied agreements. However, not everything went smoothly between the Western Allies and the USSR. Disagreements resulted in the Cold War.

Despite the fact that the truce points provided the Soviets with great power in the future in Romania, there were some provisions that put the unity of the Western allies and the Soviets to temptations that they did not overcome. For example, already in the fall of 1944, it turned out that the provision on the protection of the property of foreign citizens and the impossibility of taking it out of Romania became a point of conflict between America and the USSR. The USSR took out of Romania all the equipment for the exploitation of the oil of the American oil company Romano-Americana, which was confiscated by the Germans during the war³⁷.

Although it was just one in a series of imprecisely defined truce work, which due to inaccuracy was interpreted and implemented by all parties in accordance with their own interests, the Soviet confiscation of American oil equipment and infrastructure, under the pretext of serving the Nazis during the war, turned in the longest-running and one of the most difficult disputes between Washington and Moscow when it comes to the case of Romania³⁸.

Along with the unforeseen moves of the Council in Romania, in Moscow some of the points of the armistice text were radically modified. For example, on September 4, Molotov suggested for the first time that an item should be deleted from the armistice text stating that Soviet troops were entering Romania for the purpose of restoring Romania's independence and sovereignty. This was in direct

³⁷ On the importance of oil for the Romanian economy and on the importance of oil for the occupation systems in Romania, see: Harman Chris, *Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe*, London, 1974, p. 26; Милан Ристовић, *Између 'жртве у крви' и најважнијег 'савезничког доприноса': Трећи рајх и питање југоисточноевропске нафте у Другом светском рату (с посебним освртом на британске и америчке анализе)*, „Токови историје”, 1/2017, Београд, с. 13; On relations between capital and oil, see: Vladimir Iljič Lenjin, *Imperijalizam kao najviši stadij kapitalizma*, Sarajevo, Svjetlost, 1974; More on economic development, see: Bogdan Murgescu, *România și Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice (1500-2019)*, Polirom, 2010. On the Soviet confiscation of American oil equipment, see: FRUS, The Ambassador in turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Ankara, september 3, 1944, s. 214.

³⁸ At the end of November 1944, the Americans demanded that the oil issue be discussed between Moscow and Washington, that is, to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Commission, which did not happen. FRUS, The United States Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters (Kirk), to the Secretary of State, Caserta, November 30, 1944, p. 271.

contrast to his offer, which he put before the Romanian side in April of the same year as a motive for its withdrawal from the war on the side of the Allies³⁹.

Thus, the Romanian signatories of the Armistice went to Moscow for sovereignty, but returned without it. Stalin also later suggested to the Western Allies that the word “sovereignty” should not be included in the texts of peace treaties and that the word, if it exists in the Italian treaty, should be removed from that treaty. The fact that sovereignty was not envisaged for the former Nazi allies after the war was masked by Stalin by explaining that the very act of signing peace allegedly implied sovereignty (“As to article XVIII, Molotov agreed that changes should be made to conform to the new preamble and that unless the Romanians objected, the Russian and English texts should be the only authentic ones. As to the additional British comments, Molotov agreed to ‘A’ by inserting in article I the words ‘for the purpose of reestablishing the independence and sovereignty of Romania’ before the words for which purpose she provides”)⁴⁰.

The armistice also provided other possibilities for flexible interpretation of certain points. According to one point, all organizations that could have endangered the stability of the occupying authorities should have been disbanded. This point primarily referred to the Iron Guard and foresaw the possibility that some parts of that organization could be transformed and gain a new economic and social function in the future system⁴¹. Based on that provision, after the war, the Legionars partially joined Maniu's People's Peasant Party, partly joined the Communist Party, and those who did not take advantage of the September amnesty organized the core of anti-communist resistance movements⁴². According to one of the armistice points, the obligation of the Council was to establish the Romanian administration in the background of the front at a depth of 50-100 kilometers (“Romanian civil administration is restored in the hole area of Romania separated by not less than 50 to 100 kilometers (depending on geographical conditions) from the front line, administrative bodies undertaking to carry out instructions and orders issued by Allied (Soviet) High Command for the purpose of securing the execution

³⁹ FRUS, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Ankara, September 3, 1944, p. 214.

⁴⁰ FRUS, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Ankara, September 3, 1944, p. 214, On the guarantees for Romania, see: FRUS, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 16, 1944, p. 244; FRUS, The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Mac Veagh) to the Secretary of the State, Cairo, April 8, 1944, p. 170; FRUS, Declaration of New Romanian Government in Broadcast on August 23, 1944, over Radio Romania, p. 191-192; On Stalin's idea to remove the word “sovereignty” from all contracts, see: *България в секретния архив на Сталин. От правителството на Кимон Георгиев до смъртта на Сталин*, София, 2005, p. 131-136.

⁴¹ Др Оливера Драгишић, *Конституисање комунистичке власти на Балкану после другог светског рата: компаративна анализа структуре власти у Југославији, Бугарској и Румунији 1944-1947* (doctoral thesis, 2018), p. 70.

⁴² Тимофеев Алексей Юрьевич, Тасич Димитар, Драгишич Оливера, *ВОЙНА ПОСЛЕ ВОЙНЫ Движение сопротивления на Балканах 1945-1953*. гг, Вече, Москва, 2019, p. 305-388.

of these armistice terms”)⁴³. But that provision already caused administrative problems in Transylvania in October.

Especially after the Yalta conference, it was difficult, but not impossible, for the Soviets to maintain their positions in Romania on the basis of the Armistice. The American insistence on the tripartite participation of the allies in the Allied Control Commission was contrary to the previously reached agreements⁴⁴. The Soviets have always reminded them of two facts: first, if the Allies in Romania want a stable front, the government must be firmly in Soviet hands. From there, in March 1945, the Soviets installed the pro-Soviet government of Petru Groza (“The Soviet Government is of the opinion that after the formation in Romania of the Government of concentration of democratic forces which brought about the establishment of order and tranquility – this having a most important bearing on the security of the rear line communications of the Soviet armies fighting against the Germans – the situation in Romania does not now require any special measures being taken the part of the United States, Great Britain or the Soviet Union”)⁴⁵. Secondly, the initial agreement was not the equal participation of the Allies in the Allied Control Commission, so the Soviets always reminded the Western Allies of the Italian case of armistice.

Hungarian historian Janos Kornai put forward the thesis that the structure of government was the seed from which socialism developed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans⁴⁶. According to him, that seed carried the “genetic program” of the future system. Here, we hypothesize that the core of that seed and its genetic material came from war agreements between the Western Allies and the USSR. In the case of the countries that were former German satellites, it was embodied in the texts of the Armistice based on the Italian case.

Conclusion

One of the most significant events in laying the foundations of the post-war socialist system in Romania was the Allied signing of the Armistice with Badoglio's government in Italy in September 1943. By recognizing the Badoglio government, the Soviets made a political concession to the Western Allies, thereby leaving one of the strongest communist parties outside the future power structure, which resulted in ceding the Balkans (with the exception of Greece) to the Soviets. The Soviet interest was to keep Romania firmly under control.

The way in which the Western allies in Italy carried out an unconditional surrender in 1943 and signed the Armistice became the model for the truce with

⁴³ FRUS, The British Embassy to the Department of State, Washington, September 2, 1944, 209-210.

⁴⁴ FRUS, The American Representative in Romania (Berry) to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Vyshinsky), Bucharest, March 1, 1945, p. 490.

⁴⁵ FRUS, The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Moscow, March 17, 1945; Vasile Vesa, “Conferința de la Yalta și instaurarea guvernului condus de Petru Groza”, in *6 Martie 1945. Începuturile comunizării României*. București, 1995, p. 43, 44, 47.

⁴⁶ Янош Корнай, *Социалистическата система. Политическа икономия на комунизма*, p. 51, 349.

Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in the autumn of 1944. The text of the Armistice was the basic document from which the post-war system in Romania developed. Based on it, the institution of the Allied Occupation Power, the Allied Control Commission, was organized in Bucharest with the powers of the executive. Within it, the Soviet Union, according to the Allied Agreement, was given an advantage in the implementation of the provisions of the Armistice, just as in the Italian Allied Control Commission, that advantage belonged to the Anglo-Americans. Hence, the "Italian case" and the actions of the Anglo-American representatives in the Italian Allied Control Commission served the Soviets as a "corrective". The Soviet understanding of its future influence in Romania was based on Stalin's belief that the USSR in Romania should organize its administration in the same way that the Western Allies organized their administration in Italy – as a kind of reciprocity between them. In February 1944, it was already certain that the Allies in occupied Romania would be represented by the Soviets. In this way, a balance was established between the Allies. Italy, on the one hand, and Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, on the other, strategically provided the Allies with a path to Central Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, respectively.

In order to be able to use the executive power for its own benefit, the USSR set the preparations for building power in Romania earlier, from the *coup d'etat* on August 23, until the establishment of the Allied Control Commission in mid-October 1944. For that, they needed British cooperation. The harmonization of British and Soviet interests in the Balkans lasted from the spring of 1944, first through the arrangements "Romania for Greece", then "Bulgaria for Greece", then through September, prolonging the signing of the Armistice by introducing amendments, and finally through October with the percentage division of interests in the Balkans. Viewed from the perspective of 1947, when the socialist regime was finally implemented in Romania, the terms of the Armistice (derived from the Italian case) can be considered the basis from which the socialist system in Romania was introduced.

Despite the fact that the truce points provided the Soviets with great power in the future in Romania, there were some provisions that put the unity of the Western allies and the Soviets to the test. For example, already in the fall of 1944, it turned out that the provision on the protection of the property of foreign citizens and the impossibility of taking it out of Romania became a point of conflict between America and the USSR. The USSR removed from Romania all the equipment for the exploitation of the oil of the American oil company Romano-Americana, which was confiscated by the Germans during the war.

Although it was just one in a series of imprecisely defined truce work, which due to inaccuracy was interpreted and implemented by all parties in accordance with their own interests, the Soviet confiscation of American oil equipment and infrastructure, under the pretext of serving the Nazis during the war, turned to be in the long-run one of the most difficult disputes between Washington and Moscow when it comes to the case of Romania.

Italian precedent for the armistice negotiations with Romania in 1944

Abstract

The paper examines the impact of the armistice signed by the Allies with Badoglio's government in Italy in 1943 on allied armistice with Romania in 1944. The study is based on the theory that the text of the Italian armistice and the way in which the government was established in Italy were the model by which the government was built in Romania a few years later. The Soviets insisted on reciprocity, expecting that its influence in Romania would correspond to military and political influence of the USA in Italy. The central institution through which the regime in Romania was established, the Allied Control Commission, was a direct result of the signing of the Armistice with the Romanian delegation in Moscow in September 1944.

Keywords: Romania; Italy; USSR; Armistice; Allied Control Commission.

ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III ^a ediție, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L'Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDBM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Archiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
„Arhiva”	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei
<i>ASRR</i>	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
<i>AȘUI</i>	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași

ATS	= Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville
AUAIC	= Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
AUB	= Analele Universității „București”
BA	= <i>Biblioteca Ambrosiana</i> , Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
BAR	= Biblioteca Academiei Române
BArchB	= Bundesarchiv Berlin
BAR int. ser.	= British Archaeological Reports, International Series
BBRF	= Buletinul Bibliotecii Române din Freiburg
BCIR	= Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României
BCMI	= Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice
BCU-Iași	= Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași
BE	= Bulletin Epigraphique
BF	= Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam
BJ	= Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn
BMI	= Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice
BMIM	= București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
BNB	= Biblioteca Națională București
BNJ	= Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher
BOR	= Biserica Ortodoxă Română
BS	= Balkan Studies
BSNR	= Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române
ByzSlav	= Byzantinoslavica
CA	= Cercetări arheologice
CAI	= Caiete de Antropologie Istorică
CartNova	= <i>La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica</i> , Murcia
CB	= Cahiers balkaniques
CC	= Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)
CCAR	= Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București
CCh	= <i>Corpus Christianorum</i> , Turnhout
CChSG	= <i>Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca</i>
CCSL	= <i>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina</i> , Turnhout, Brepols
CDM	= <i>Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat</i> , București, vol. I-V; supl. I.
CDȚR	= <i>Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului</i> , București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006
Chiron	= Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971
CI	= Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)
CIL	= <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> , Berlin
CL	= Cercetări literare
CLRE	= <i>Consuls of the Later Roman Empire</i> , eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987
CN	= Cercetări Numismatice
CNA	= Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București
CSCO	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium</i> , Louvain
CSEA	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis</i> , Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
CSEL	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i> , Wien, De Gruyter
CSPAMI	= Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești
CT	= Columna lui Traian, București
CTh	= <i>Codex Theodosianus</i> . Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971
Cv.L	= Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)

„Dacia”, N.S.	= Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
DANIC	= Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istoric Centrale
DGAS	= Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
DI	= Diplomatarium Italicum
DIR	= <i>Documente privind istoria României</i>
DIRRI	= <i>Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență</i>
DOP	= Dumbarton Oaks Papers
DTN	= <i>Din trecutul nostru</i> , Chișinău
DRH	= <i>Documenta Romaniae Historica</i>
EB	= Études Balkaniques
EBPB	= Études byzantines et post-byzantines
EDCS	= <i>Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby</i> (http://www.manfredclaus.de/)
EDR	= <i>Epigraphic Database Roma</i> (http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php)
EpigrAnat	= <i>Epigraphica Anatolica</i> , Münster
ER Asturias	= F. Diego Santos, <i>Epigrafia Romana de Asturias</i> , Oviedo, 1959.
Gerión	= Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
GB	= Glasul Bisericii
GCS	= <i>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller</i> , Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
GLK	= <i>Grammatici Latini Keil</i>
HEp	= <i>Hispania Epigraphica</i> , Madrid
„Hierasus”	= <i>Hierasus</i> . Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
HM	= <i>Heraldica Moldaviae</i> , Chișinău
HU	= <i>Historia Urbana</i> , Sibiu
HUI	= <i>Historia Universitatis Iassensis</i> , Iași
IDR	= <i>Inscripțiile din Dacia romană</i> , București-Paris
IDRE	= <i>Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie</i> , I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
IGLN	= <i>Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae</i> , Bordeaux
IGLR	= <i>Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România</i> , București, 1976
IILPecs	= <i>Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften</i> , Pecs, 1991
ILAlg	= <i>Inscriptions latines d'Algérie</i> , Paris
ILB	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae</i> , Sofia, 1989
ILD	= <i>Inscripții latine din Dacia</i> , București
ILN	= <i>Inscriptions latines de Novae</i> , Poznań
ILLPRON	= <i>Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices</i> , Berlin, 1986
ILS	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 1892
IMS	= <i>Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris</i> , Belgrad
IN	= „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
ISM	= <i>Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine</i> , București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
JGO	= <i>Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas</i>
JL	= <i>Junimea literară</i>
JRS	= <i>The Journal of Roman studies</i> , London
LR	= <i>Limba română</i>
MA	= <i>Memoria Antiquitatis</i> , Piatra Neamț
MCA	= <i>Materiale și cercetări arheologice</i>
MEF	= <i>Moldova în epoca feudalismului</i> , vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
MEFRA	= <i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité</i> , Roma

MGH	= <i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi</i> , Berlin 1877-
MI	= Magazin istoric, București
MIM	= Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
MM	= Mitropolia Moldovei
MMS	= Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei
MN	= Muzeul Național, București
MO	= Mitropolia Olteniei
MOF	= Monitorul Oficial al României
Navarro	= M. Navarro Caballero, <i>Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'élite dans l'Hispanie romaine</i> , Bordeaux, 2017.
NBA	= <i>Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana</i> , Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum
NDPAC	= <i>Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane</i> , I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008
NEH	= Nouvelles études d'histoire
OI	= Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași
OPEL	= <i>Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum</i> , vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002
PG	= <i>Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca</i> , ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912
PIR	= <i>Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III</i> , editio altera, Berlin.
PLRE	= <i>Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire</i> , 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992
RA	= Revista arhivelor
RBAR	= Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București
RC	= Revista catolică
RdI	= Revista de istorie
REByz	= Revue des Études Byzantines
RER	= Revue des études roumaines
RESEE	= Revue des études Sud-Est européennes
RHP	= <i>Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften</i> , Viena
RHSEE	= Revue historique de Sud-Est européen
RI	= Revista istorică (ambele serii)
RIAF	= Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie
RIB	= <i>Roman Inscriptions of Britain</i> , Londra
RIM	= Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău
RIR	= Revista istorică română, București
RIS	= Revista de istorie socială, Iași
RITL	= Revista de istorie și teorie literară
RIU	= <i>Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns</i> , Budapesta
RJMH	= The Romanian Journal of Modern History, Iași
RM	= Revista muzeelor
RMD	= <i>Roman Military Diplomas</i> , Londra
RMM	= <i>Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums</i> , Mainz
RMM-MIA	= Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă
RMR	= Revista Medicală Română
RRH	= Revue roumaine d'histoire
RRHA	= Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art
RRHA-BA	= Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts
RSIAB	= Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău
Rsl	= Romanoslavica

<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>Sch</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= <i>Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica</i> , Iași
<i>T&MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde