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## CUPRINS

Ana Honcu, <i>Initiative édititaire des femmes dans les provinces de Dacie et Mésie Inférieure (I<sup>er</sup>-III<sup>e</sup> siècles apr. J.-C.)</i> .....	7
Lucrețiu Mihailescu-Bîrliba, <i>New data on the salt resources from Ocna Dejului-Sic-Cojocna-Gherla area in Roman Dacia</i> .....	19
Ioan-Aurel Pop, Alexandru Simon, <i>Moartea „ducelui Valahiei”: situația din Moldova în informațiile Casei de Habsburg din vara anului 1496</i> .....	27
Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, <i>Rebellion and Peace: The paths for conflict resolution in Huguenot and Catholic propaganda during the French Wars of Religion</i> .....	33
Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, <i>Mormintele Cantacuzinilor moldoveni (secolele XVII-XIX)</i> .....	55
Ștefan Lemny, <i>Istoria ca o poveste: Istoria Imperiului Otoman de Cantemir</i> .....	83
Petronel Zahariuc, <i>Contribuții la istoria familiei Balș în secolul al XVIII-lea – începutul secolului al XIX-lea, după testamente și foi de zestre</i> .....	95

\*\*\*

Ștefan S. Gorovei, <i>Heraldica teritorială – manifest de putere?</i> .....	123
Laurențiu Rădvan, <i>Din consecințele Regulamentului Organic: înființarea Eforiei orașului Iași și alegerea primilor săi membri</i> .....	139
Simion Câlția, <i>Practici științifice și norme sanitare în regulamentele Laboratorului comunal chimico-bacteriologic al Bucureștiului</i> .....	157
Claudiu-Lucian Topor, <i>Carsten Nielsen and his “controversial” agreements in Romania (1915). Files re-opened in Nazi Germany</i> .....	169
Iana Bălan, <i>Ofensiva Brusilov: catalizator al negocierilor și al intrării României în război? Câteva ipoteze istoriografice</i> .....	191

\*\*\*

Adrian Vițalaru, <i>Strategic interests and economic cooperation. The beginning of trade relations between Romania and Poland (1920-1921)</i> .....	207
Ionel Doctoru, <i>„Vrem Ambasadă la Paris!” – Demersurile autorităților române pentru modificarea statutului Legației din capitala Franței (1926)</i> .....	221
Daniela Popescu, <i>Educație, școli și propagandă în cadrul grupului etnic german din România (1940-1944)</i> .....	235
Vasile Ungureanu, <i>Le diplomate Alexandru Paleologu</i> .....	249
Ciprian Nițulescu, <i>Între stema regală și steaua roșie. Aspecte privind personalul diplomatic al României (1947-1952)</i> .....	263
Iulian Moga, <i>Mama Gabrieli, the contemporary confessor of Georgia</i> .....	297
Andi Mihalache, <i>Despre tăcere și noile abordări din studiile culturale</i> .....	311

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<i>Recenzii și note bibliografice .....</i>	339
<p>Alexandru Vulpe, <i>Protoistoria României</i>, ediție îngrijită de Radu Băjenaru, București, Editura Academiei Române, 2020, 308 p. (Bogdan-Ștefan Novac); Irina Nemțeanu, <i>Ipostaze ale locuirii comunităților evreiești din Moldova (1775-1930)</i>, București, Editura Simetria, 2022 (Tudor Gaiță); Andreea Pop, <i>Arhitectura de veci în România. Cimitire, mausolee, edificii funerare în spațiul extracarpatic (1830-1939)</i>, București, Editura Patrimonia, 2021, 224 p. (Ioan Grămadă); <i>Servitorii Statului: funcționari, funcții și funcționarism în România modernă (1830-1948)</i>, coord. Judit Pál, Vlad Popovici, Andrei Florin Sora, Cluj-Napoca, Mega, 2022, 452 p. (Dan-Alexandru Săvoaia); <i>Elita românească și itinerariile modernității. Omagiu Profesorului Mihai Cojocariu</i>, coord. Cristian Ploscaru, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2021, 555 p. (Ion Cârja); <i>Identitățile Chișinăului: Strada 31 August 1989</i>, coord. Sergiu Musteață, Alexandru Corduneanu, Chișinău, 2023, 249 p. (Mihai Anatolii Ciobanu); Paul Brummell, <i>Diplomatic Gifts. A History in Fifty Presents</i>, London, Hurst&amp;Company, 2022, 423 p. (Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu); James Stourton, <i>British Embassies. Their Diplomatic and Architectural History</i>, photographs by Luke White, London, Frances Lincoln Publishers, 2017, 352 p. (Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu); Norman Stone, <i>Primul Război Mondial. O scurtă istorie</i>, București, Editura Litera, 2023, 256 p. (Andrei Chirilă); Diana Preston, <i>Opt zile la Ialta. Cum au configurat Churchill, Roosevelt și Stalin lumea postbelică</i>, București, Editura RAO, 2022, 473 p. (Andreea Ioana Ursulescu).</p>	
<i>Abrevieri .....</i>	361

## Rebellion and Peace: The paths for conflict resolution in Huguenot and Catholic propaganda during the French Wars of Religion

### Introduction

Of all the evils which could afflict a medieval and early modern state, internal strife was regarded as the worst, lamented by all political theorists without exception: the theory was backed by irrefutable evidence from the history of mankind, ancient or contemporary – the Roman civil wars, the conflict between Armagnacs and Burgundians during the reign of Charles VI (1380-1422) or the War of the Roses (1455-1485) being only the most prominent examples of the frightening consequences that such a situation could cause. If foreign wars might have been acceptable given the right circumstances (if they met the conditions for “just wars”, as set out by Augustine), internal peace was always the ideal state a realm should find itself in. This was one of the strongest arguments for the medieval and early modern advocates of hereditary monarchy, as opposed to elective monarchies or republican governments: not limited to being a mirror of the celestial hierarchy (something which could be said about elective monarchies as well), a hereditary monarchy was regarded as the most suited to ensure a smooth transition of power, at the most dangerous moment when the political harmony of the kingdom was most likely to fall apart. Together with justice, peacemaking was the most fundamental duty of the medieval and early modern king, the most poignant expression of what Walter Ullmann referred to as the “tutorial function of the king”<sup>1</sup>. As pointed out by Jean Barbey, “the king exercises a unifying will within the framework of the common good and the peace”<sup>2</sup>, therefore he is the

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Ullmann, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages: An Introduction to the Sources of Medieval Political Ideas*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 214-215.

<sup>2</sup> Jean Barbey, *La fonction royale: essence et légitimité d'après les Tractatus de Jean de Terrevermeille*, Paris, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1983, p. 108.

living embodiment of the principle of unity, which, in turn, ensures the tranquility of the kingdom. In such circumstances, there is no wonder that medieval theorists established a link between the health of the king and the health of the kingdom<sup>3</sup>, a link which exists not only metaphorically, but finds its expression in political reality, as evidenced by the political infighting that always accompanied any decrease of the royal authority. However, discord, and its consequence, civil wars, were to be avoided at all cost. For this reason, we could often encounter repeated exhortations to find peaceful solutions whenever internal dissensions seemed on the brink of transforming into open warfare: one of the most poignant examples of this sort was Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, who, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, when the conflict between the Orléans and Burgundian clans for the control of France and its mad king Charles VI threatened to turn into open warfare, delivered multiple public sermons, in front of the French court, calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the French princes<sup>4</sup>. For Gerson and for all the other political theorists, the king was the principal peacemaker and, therefore, they fully gave their support to the strengthening of the royal authority during the fifteenth century. The medieval discourse on peacemaking was, first and foremost, royalist — and this mindset will leave its mark on the developments during the French Wars of Religion.

### **The Reformation and the Collapse of French Religious Unity before the Wars of Religion**

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, France seemed the most stable and the most powerful state of the Western Europe, while the internal conflicts that had troubled the kingdom during the previous centuries seemed a thing of the past: these conflicts had always been the result of an overambitious aristocracy trying to either increase its privileges at the expense of royal authority or merely resist royal encroachments, but, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the power of this aristocracy looked spent in face of a triumphant monarchy. But this apparent internal consensus was going to be shattered by the spread of the Reformation. It is no wonder that the French authorities reacted with alarm, because unity of faith was considered the most important requirement for internal peace. For the

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<sup>3</sup> See Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, *Reprezentări și semnificații politice ale malădiei la începuturile modernității: Anglia anilor 1470-1610*, Iași, Editura Universității “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2012, p. 109-138. This link was particularly poignant in the work of Christine de Pizan (for an analysis of Cristine de Pizan’s corporal analogies, see also Stephen H. Rigby, *The Body Politic in the Social and Political Thought of Christine De Pizan (Abridged Version): Reciprocity, Hierarchy and Political Authority*, in “Cahiers des recherches médiévales et humanistes”, 24 (2012), p. 461-483; Stephen H. Rigby, *The Body Politic in the Social and Political Thought of Christine de Pizan (Abridged Version): Social Inequality and Social Justice*, in “Cahiers des recherches médiévales et humanistes”, 25 (2013), p. 559-579).

<sup>4</sup> See Louis Mourin, *Jean Gerson, prédicateur français*, Bruges, De Tempel, 1952, p. 169-175, p. 187-196; Nancy McLoughlin, *Jean Gerson and Gender: Rhetoric and Politics in Fifteenth-Century France*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, p. 97-98, 121-127.

sixteenth-century individual, it seemed inconceivable that two religions could co-exist within the same state, without attacking each other. The motto of the French Crown in the early sixteenth century was “one king, one faith, one law”. Therefore, disturbance of public peace was one of the charges thrown at the Protestants, in order to facilitate the identification between their religious non-conformism and sedition.

The Valois monarchy shared these opinions: despite his initial sympathies for humanist ideas of reform, Francis I, when faced with manifestations as shocking (for the sixteenth-century Catholic) as attacks against the Mass, chose the path of persecution. How he came to see Protestantism is revealed in an edict from 1540, which claims that profession of false doctrine “contains in itself the crimes of human and divine lèse-majesté, popular sedition, and the disturbance of our state and the public peace”<sup>5</sup>: from this perspective, heresy and sedition were the same thing. His successor, Henry II, intensified the anti-Protestant policies and, unlike Francis, he refused to allow his foreign policy, which dictated an alliance with the German Protestant princes against the power of the Habsburgs, to influence his harsh stance against the Reformation. Just like his father, for Henry II, “heretic” was synonymous with “rebel”, a point he clearly made in a 1558 letter addressed to the German Protestant princes, who were seeking his clemency for a group of Protestants arrested at Paris on 5 September 1557, when they were taking part in a clandestine religious service: Henry II rejected the appeal of the German princes and asserted that the arrested Protestants were “disturbers of the public peace and enemies of the tranquility and unity of Christians”<sup>6</sup>. In the words of Janine Garrisson, “to deny Catholicism was to deny the religion of the king, and thus in effect to deny the king himself”<sup>7</sup>. Henry II was obviously not the only ruler who thought in these terms: all did and it is no surprise that the religious settlement in Germany, as established by the peace of Augsburg in 1555, imposed the principle “cuius regio eius religio”, which authorized the rulers to force their religion upon their subjects, whose only recourse, if they belonged to a different faith than their prince, was leaving their lands for others more friendly. According to Perez Zagorin, the ruthless persecution of Protestantism by Catholic monarchs was determined not just by religious bigotry, but also by a deep-felt conviction “that if subjects were divided from their rulers in so fundamental a matter as religion they

<sup>5</sup> Nancy Lyman Roelker, *One King, One Faith: The Parlement of Paris and the Religious Reformations of the Sixteenth Century*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1996, p. 208.

<sup>6</sup> Christopher Elwood, *The Body Broken: The Calvinist Doctrine of the Eucharist and the Symbolization of Power in Sixteenth-Century France*, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 77. For an account of this event, the international reaction and the response of Henry II, see also Hugues Daussey, *Le Parti huguenot: chronique d'une désillusion (1557-1572)*, Geneva, Librairie Droz, 2015, p. 21-64.

<sup>7</sup> Janine Garrisson, *A History of Sixteenth-Century France, 1483-1598: Renaissance, Reformation and Rebellion*, translated by Richard Rex, 1995, Basingstoke, MacMillan Press, p. 206

might well be led into political opposition or revolt”<sup>8</sup>. However, the efforts to suppress Protestantism in France failed: on the contrary, between 1555 and 1562, we witness a massive increase in the number of new converts, who start to include members of the high aristocracy – much to the disbelief and the discomfort of the monarchy, which used to regard heresy as the preserve of the lower orders –, accompanied by the rapid organization of Protestant Churches.

The death of Henry II, on 10 July 1559, following a tourney accident, provided a fresh opportunity to the Protestants, because Henry had been the main driving force behind the policy of persecution and he had made peace with Spain in 1559 with the expressed purpose of carrying out the suppression of Protestantism in France. His demise was seen by the reformers as a divine punishment and a sign of the impending triumph of the Reformation, a point that many reformed pastors took care to emphasize in their propaganda. He was followed in quick succession by his sons, Francis II, whose reign lasted less than a year and a half, and Charles IX. With the Protestants gaining in strength, the government of Charles IX, headed by Catherine de Medici as regent for her underage son, resigned itself, by 1561, to the fact that a policy of repression had become completely impossible and some sort of accommodation had to be reached. Already, in December 1560, at the opening of the Estates General, the chancellor Michel de L’Hôpital had stated his position on the need for unity in the interest of peace. First, he emphasized the obedience owed by all to the new king, and the need to resolve differences, so as to establish “tranquility” for all<sup>9</sup>. What L’Hopital was hinting at was to become the main tenet of the French royal policy over the next three decades, namely, that “only the maintenance of the crown’s authority could guarantee the peace to which all aspired”<sup>10</sup>. The beginning was already made in May 1560, with the Edict of Romorantin, which entrusted the prosecution of heresy cases to the episcopal courts – which did not have the right to impose the death penalty – and, for the first time, distinguished between heresy and sedition, while amnesties were repeatedly offered to the Protestants. However, since it could be claimed that these edicts were in conflict with the coronation oath of the King of France promising to preserve the Catholic faith, they were “introduced as ‘provisional’, intended not definitively ‘to approve two religions in our kingdom’, but simply to ‘make our subjects live and remain in tranquility and peace’”<sup>11</sup>.

In September 1561, a religious conference was arranged at Poissy, between Catholic and Protestant theologians, in the hope that a religious compromise could be reached: the attempt failed utterly, though, in face of the intransigence of both

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<sup>8</sup> Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1600*, vol. I, Cambridge and London, Cambridge University Press, p. 145.

<sup>9</sup> Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars c. 1560-1600*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p. 22.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Howell A. Lloyd, *The State, France and the Sixteenth Century*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983, p. 78.



parties, those who would have been willing to make concessions in this regard being completely in minority. The only thing left for the monarchy to do was to try to implement a policy of temporary toleration, in the hope of calming the tensions, while waiting for a better solution. The outcome of this decision was the Edict of Saint-Germain, issued in January 1562, which granted the Protestants freedom of conscience and a limited freedom of worship. It was clearly specified that, by this edict, the monarchy did not approve the existence of two religions within the kingdom; it was an occasion “to assert the absolute royal power, the sole preserver of the civil peace and the sole introducer of God’s pardon, because the king was a minister of God”<sup>12</sup>. However, this approach ended in a failure as well, when, in March 1562, a massacre of a group of Protestants at Vassy by Catholics from the retinue of the duke of Guise took place and the Huguenots reacted by rising up in revolt, under the leadership of the prince Louis de Condé. Thus, the worst came to pass: France was embroiled again in a civil war, this time more dangerous because religious tensions had been the main catalyst and were much harder to appease than the usual aristocratic ambitions.

### **The Religious Wars and the Huguenot Vision of Achieving Peace**

The French Wars of Religion that started in 1562 will continue, with interruptions, until 1598, when Henry IV managed to put an end to them by his famous Edict of Nantes. However, until then, there had been numerous, even desperate, other attempts to restore peace. The Crown issued no less than seven edicts of pacifications: the edict of Amboise in 1563, the edict of Longjumeau in 1568, the edict of Saint-Germain in 1570, edict of La Rochelle in 1573, edict of Beaulieu in 1576, edict of Bergerac in 1577, edict of Fleix in 1580. These peace edicts had a clearly political character and constituted, according to Penny Roberts, “an attempt to take the sectarian tensions out of the process by subordinating religious difference to the rule of law”, in order to achieve peace “through the proper exercise of royal justice as upheld by its specially appointed commissioners”<sup>13</sup>. In turn, the Huguenots also waged an intensive propaganda campaign and made clear their own vision of how peace was to be restored in France. The key issue of this propaganda campaign was that the Huguenot political leadership constantly refused to acknowledge their rebellion and to present themselves as being at war with the King of France: instead, they portrayed their actions as having the purpose of protecting the king and his kingdom against

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<sup>12</sup> Denis Crouzet, *Dieu en ses royaumes: une histoire des Guerres de Religion*, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 2008, p. 350.

<sup>13</sup> Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars*, p. 51. For the way the Crown tried to maintain the peace by implementing its edicts, see also Jérémie Foa, *Le tombeau de la paix: une histoire des édits de pacification (1560-1572)*, Limoges, Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 2015, which, together with Penny Robert’s book, *Peace and Authority...*, is the most comprehensive analysis of the policy of pacification that the Valois monarchy tried to implement.

treacherous and misleading advisors, who, under the pretext of defending Catholicism, were seeking only to further their own interests.

At the beginning of the first war, on 8 April 1562, Louis de Condé, the leader of the Huguenots, issued from his headquarters at Orléans a justificative proclamation, which explained the reasons for the take up of arms and also revealed the Protestants' ideas about the restoration of peace within the kingdom<sup>14</sup>. Condé and his Huguenot supporters basically pinned their hopes on a potentially sympathetic monarch, who had to be persuaded of the obedience and the good intentions of his Protestant subjects: consequently, a policy ignoring the religious differences between Catholics and Huguenots, while granting the latter freedom of conscience and at least a limited freedom of public worship, had to be implemented. According to Condé, such a policy was about to be put into practice in January 1562, through the edict of Saint-Germain, which was issued by the king "with the advice of the most noteworthy and best chosen assembly that the king could have picked in all his Parlements"<sup>15</sup>. For peace to take hold, the measures taken for this purpose had to come, first and foremost, from a legitimate authority: that meant, first and foremost, the king – hence the efforts of the Huguenots to co-opt the monarchy during the entire French Wars of Religion, even despite the

<sup>14</sup> During the first war of religion (1562-1563), there were eight such propagandistic texts published by Condé: his first proclamation from 8 April 1562, a treaty of association between Condé and his aristocratic allies on 11 April, a second declaration on 25 April, a third text published on 2 May 1562 detailing the Huguenot terms for a potential peace, a fourth text attacking his Catholic enemies on 19 May 1562, a fifth on 5 July 1562, a sixth on 18 July 1562 – these last two adopting a more confessionalized tone, with a greater emphasis on the religious nature of the struggle –, a seventh (a remonstrance addressed to the queen-mother) on 8 August 1562 and an eighth, a lengthy piece which asserted in detail Condé's doctrine of revolt, on 1 October 1562. Since many of Condé's arguments repeat themselves throughout the entire corpus and a detailed analysis of each piece is impossible due to space constraints, I will use the text of his first justification, from 8 April 1562, in order to illustrate his main ideas, with only occasional references, when needed, to the others. For a detailed analysis of this corpus, see Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, *Calvinist Notions of Resistance and Huguenot Noble Propaganda: The Justificative Texts of Louis de Condé during the First War of Religion*, in "Chrétien et Sociétés: XVIe-XXIe siècles", 29 (2022), p. 165-194. During the second war of religion, Condé's propaganda consisted of, mainly, three "requêtes", addressed directly to the king in October 1567, the first containing a general justification of the Huguenot rebellion, the second presenting Condé's political program and list of demands and the third showing a greater focus on specifically-Calvinist concerns. Finally, at the beginning of the third war of religion, Condé reiterated his point of view in three texts, two of them, a letter and a remonstrance to the king, sent from Noyers on 23 August 1568, and a third issued at La Rochelle and dated on 9 September 1568; after his death at the battle of Jarnac, on 13 March 1569, another similar declaration was issued in the name of Henry de Navarre and Condé's son, the new prince Henry. For an extensive discussion of Condé's propaganda in 1567 and 1568, see Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, *The Justificative Discourse of Louis de Condé during the Second and Third Wars of Religion*, in "Argumentum. Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric", 20 (2022), p. 33-58.

<sup>15</sup> *Mémoires de Condé ou recueil pour servir à l'histoire de France, contenant ce qui s'est passé de plus mémorable dans le royaume, sous le règne de François II. Et sous une partie de celui de Charles IX. où l'on trouvera des preuves de l'histoire de M. de Thou: augmentés d'un grand nombre de pièces curieuses, qui n'ont jamais été imprimées*, London, Claude du Bosc Guillaume Darrés, 1743 (from now on referred to as *Mémoires de Condé*), Tome 3, p. 223, 229-230.

temporary radicalism triggered by Saint Bartholomew amongst their lower ranks. This was the constant problem of the Huguenots during the Wars of Religion (at least until the 1589 agreement between Henry III and Henry de Navarre to fight together against the Catholic League): whenever hostilities broke out, the king was always (sometimes more willingly, sometimes less) on the other side. The Huguenots never managed to obtain control of the king's person, or at least his support – while their enemies did. In 1562, Condé and his associates declared Charles IX and his mother, Catherine de Medici, as having been taken captive by a Catholic faction, led by François de Guise, bent on war. In 1567 and in the later conflicts, because the king was no longer under age and the theme of a physical captivity could not be maintained anymore, the Huguenots changed their rhetoric in order to stress out a “moral captivity” of the king, who was deceived by evil advisors regarding the true intentions of the Protestants. In such a situation, the king, obviously, could not fulfill his traditional and fundamental role of an impartial judge – hence, the Huguenots could submit to the royal authority only once the pernicious influence of their enemies over the king was removed<sup>16</sup>. To do otherwise would have led to the triumph of a malicious aristocratic cabal, to the detriment of both the king and the kingdom.

However, for an edict of pacification to be unassailable, the consent of the political community (or at least its most “sanior pars”) was also necessary: this is why Condé emphasized the participation of a wide political assembly in the drafting of the Edict from January 1562 and why the Huguenots would always insist on the involvement of similar assemblies, and in particular of the Estates General, in the set up of a peace framework. In order for any such agreement to prove itself durable, it had to be protected against possible arbitrariness from the king (or his successor) and against the bad faith of any ill-intentioned political actors, who might try to prevent its implementation. In such a situation, if the worst came to pass, the Huguenots could claim that the infringement of the agreement's clauses was illegal and they, in turn, could lawfully take up arms for the protection of the laws of the kingdom, therefore casting their enemies as outlaws. The text of Condé's first proclamation already points out the existence and the damaging actions of such actors: the Parlements dominated by Catholics, which might try to obstruct or delay the registration of royal edicts of pacification, and, especially, the hardline Catholic aristocratic clans like the Guises. The failure of the Edict of January 1562 was, in the opinion of the Huguenots, due to both: the Parlement of Paris for having delayed the registration of the edict, and the duke François de Guise, whose retinue slaughtered a group of Huguenot worshippers on 1 March 1562 at Vassy, event that served as the trigger for the Protestant rebellion. The call for the summoning of the Estates General will appear again and again in Huguenot propaganda of the period, for instance in Condé's declaration from 1 October 1562, entitled *Discours des moyens que monsieur le prince de Condé a tenus pour*

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 233-235.

*pacifier les troubles qui sont à présent en ce royaume: par lequel l'innocence dudict seigneur prince est vérifiée, et les calomnies et impostures de ses adversaires clairement decouvertes*<sup>17</sup> or in the “requêtes” from October 1567<sup>18</sup>.

Since Condé's text of 8 April 1562 indicates as the main cause of the Huguenot rising the intent of François de Guise and his associates, the constable Anne de Montmorency and the marshal of Saint-André, “to entirely exterminate the religion which they call new, either by sheer force, or by changing the edicts and renewing the most cruel persecutions that were ever exercised in the world” and the “most barbarous cruelties and outrages” carried out against the Protestants<sup>19</sup>, it is unavoidable that the restoration of peace becomes linked to the quest for justice. As Penny Roberts pointed out, “peace and justice were interdependent and inseparable features of a healthy polity as well as being among the primary duties of a king” and “in order to ensure the maintenance and observance of his peace edicts, the French king needed to deliver justice to all his subjects”<sup>20</sup>. This was openly acknowledged by a figure as important as the chancellor of France, Michel de l'Hôpital, the main advocate of a policy of pacification which involved accommodation with the Huguenots and who attempted to justify this policy in his speeches before hostile Parlements. L'Hôpital's idea was that “peace was vital if royal authority was to be upheld, and justice was essential to the maintenance of that peace”<sup>21</sup>. Condé's propaganda, in turn, insisted that peace failed specifically because royal authority was not upheld, but usurped, by the enemies of the Huguenots, therefore, in order to fix this state of affairs, the Huguenots had to seek all licit ways “to free the person of the king, the queen and her children, and maintain the observation of the edicts and ordinances of his majesty, and especially the last edict on the issue of religion”<sup>22</sup>. However, this application of justice was not to be limited strictly to the resolution of the Protestant religious grievances: one of the most striking feature of the Huguenot propaganda is that it constantly tried to blur the sectarian nature of their struggle and co-opt as many Catholics as possible, in order to deprive their enemies of the argument that the civil wars were a religious struggle in defense of the Catholic faith. Therefore, Condé, in his texts from 1562 and afterwards (and others after him), constantly mixed specific Protestant demands with more general requests that moderate Catholics could rally behind: thus, because it involved the usurpation of the royal power, and by an aristocratic clan of foreign origin no less (the Guises

<sup>17</sup> *Mémoires de Condé*, Tome 4, p. 1-35.

<sup>18</sup> *Recueil de toutes les choses memorables advenues, tant de par le Roy, que de par Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, Gentilshommes & autres de sa compagnie, depuis le vingt huitieme d'Octobre, Mil cinq cents soixante sept, jusques à present. Avec le discours des guerres ciuiles du pais de Flandres, 1568. Ensemble, la mort des Sieurs Comtes d'Aigemont, & de Horne, & autres gentils-hommes & marchans*, 1568, p. 18, 21-22.

<sup>19</sup> *Mémoires de Condé*, Tome 3, p. 230-231.

<sup>20</sup> Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars*, p. 107.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 106.

<sup>22</sup> *Mémoires de Condé*, Tome 3, p. 232-233.

being a cadet branch of the ruling ducal house of Lorraine), the threat posed by the Guise clan was presented not just as a danger to the Protestant community, but to all French nobility, unjustly deprived of the honors and charges that should rightfully belong to them. Additionally, the Huguenot justificative texts were constantly asking for a reduction in the fiscal burden<sup>23</sup>, thus clearly trying to link their demands for religious recognition (highly unusual in the sixteenth century) with other more traditional appeals, for which there were many historical precedents and which the king would find more difficult to deny. This aspect of the strategy of Condé and the Huguenots was accepted, grudgingly, at least, by the Valois monarchy: if the Huguenots, either in the justificative proclamations issued by their political leadership or in the monarchomach literature from the late 1560s and the 1570s, chose to propose the restoration of peace as part of a more complex political (and not Calvinist) reformation of the kingdom, both Charles IX and Henry III tried to implement a version of peace that did not align with the desires of the religious extremists, where the state “represented itself as sole solution to the religious division”, by abandoning the attempts at religious reunification by force and avoiding “all discussions on dogma in order to focus on the political resolution of the conflicts”<sup>24</sup>. Particularly amongst the Huguenot pastors, there were people who considered that Condé was too willing to sacrifice the confessional interests of the Protestants for the sake of his own goals, which were not always relevant for the Protestant faith. Such reproaches were directed against Condé, for instance, in 1563, because the peace of Amboise that ended the hostilities was less favorable to the Huguenots than the previous edict of Saint-Germain from January 1562. If Condé and his aristocratic allies tried not to focus exclusively on specific Protestant religious grievances and widen the scope of their goals, in the hope of attracting support from more moderate Catholics, the consequence of this tactic was that any peace agreement was likely to fall short of the expectations of the religious leadership of the movement. Despite the practical benefits that it could bring, the peace presented the Huguenots with the same ideological conundrum as it did for the Catholics: could the truth of God be actually a matter of negotiations? As pointed out by Penny Roberts, a peace that involved religious compromises could be considered “in some way a betrayal of the truth”, because it implied “concessions to the validity of their opponents’ position”<sup>25</sup>: therefore, for many Huguenots, peace did not have a positive value by default, its worth depending instead on the terms included in the agreements in favor of the Protestant faith, in particular on the extent of the right to public worship, which was always the sticking point for both sides.

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 233.

<sup>24</sup> Olivier Christin, *La Paix de Religion: l'autonomisation de la raison politique au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1997, p. 34-38.

<sup>25</sup> Penny Roberts, *The Languages of Peace during the French Religious Wars*, p. 302-303, in “Cultural and Social History”, 4 (3) (2007), p. 297-315

The government of Charles IX took up many of Condé's requests from 1562, albeit not to the extent many Protestant pastors would have wished. In order to appease Catholic opposition, Charles IX openly stated that he did not intend to establish two religions in his kingdom; his moderate chancellor, Michel de L'Hôpital agreed, but, in his opinion, "preserving the public peace might require departing from historic principles and allowing provisional coexistence until such time as a council, whether general or national, could resolve France's religious divisions"<sup>26</sup>. Because of L'Hôpital's attempts to find a political solution to the religious wars, Seong-Hak Kim sees the chancellor as "one of the first statesmen in France who envisaged the separation of politics and religion"<sup>27</sup>, with his policy of reinforcing royal authority as the means to achieve this goal: L'Hôpital's whole political credo was that peace could be enforced only by a strong monarchy. Time proved him right, because this is exactly what happened during Henry IV, but, in a still-personalized state like sixteenth-century France, there was no overcoming the personal weakness of the monarchs, in this case Charles IX or Henry III. Hence, L'Hôpital's policy was unachievable during the reign of these two kings: even the Huguenot propaganda, although it professed the utmost respect for the authority of the king and proclaimed its hope in a royal resolution of the conflict, was not yet prepared to accept the kind of royal control L'Hôpital was pushing for, instead insisting upon the need for representative consent even in case of those measures favoring the Huguenots.

Despite the fact that both the political leadership of the Huguenots and the royal government saw each other eye to eye on this matter, the main obstacle to peace was the mistrust between both parties. The Huguenots, despite formally asserting their trust in the king, constantly feared treachery: a meeting at Bayonne, in 1565, between Catherine de Medici and the emissaries of Philip II, the arch-enemy of the Protestants, only amplified these fears, the Huguenots suspecting a possible plot of all the Catholic powers of Europe against them. There were also problems with the actual implementation of the peace of Amboise at a local level. As pointed out before, the demand for justice loomed large amongst Condé's requests. However, the Crown's provision of justice consisted mostly not in the punishment of the crimes committed, but in providing a blanket amnesty for all but the most egregious misdeeds – a policy that came to be known as "oubliance" and would be successfully implemented by Henry IV after the Edict of Nantes in 1598. But, if even Henry IV encountered difficulties in putting this policy into practice, despite his military victory and the exhaustion of the factions after 36 years of intermittent warfare, the difficulties were much greater at an earlier time, when the hatreds and the bellicose energies were still fresh. Penny Roberts correctly points out that "this policy of 'oubliance' only served to fuel the

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<sup>26</sup> Joseph Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2014, p. 24.

<sup>27</sup> Seong-Hak Kim, *The Chancellor's Crusade: Michel de L'Hôpital and the Parlement of Paris*, in "French History", 7 (1) (1993), p. 27.

antagonism of the faiths”, because “a hardline Catholic could be accused of promoting Huguenot over Catholic interests, while a Huguenot sympathizer might face charges of indifference to crimes against Huguenot persons and property”<sup>28</sup>. More so, the chaos and violence of civil wars is always a great opportunity for settling private disputes or for personal enrichment under the mask of factional strife: the French Wars of Religion were no exception and the royal officials were perfectly aware of this issue. Hence, the royal pardons granted in the edicts of pacification were not supposed to cover actual crimes, particularly if they were extremely serious (the so-called “cas execrables”): therefore, the implementation of the royal amnesties had to separate “feuds from legitimate acts of belligerence”, which was the task of the law courts<sup>29</sup>.

After the death of Charles IX in 1574, despite his warlike “antecedents” (he had been the nominal commander of the royal army at the battles of Jarnac and Moncontour, in 1569, where the Huguenots suffered two significant defeats), Henry III decided to pursue the same policy of pacification through concessions made to the Huguenots that had been attempted during the 1560s. Unfortunately for him, at the beginning of his reign, he had to do this from a position of weakness, because circumstances forced him to face the most dangerous coalition the Crown had been confronted with until that time during the wars of religion: the Huguenots, who had risen in revolt after Saint-Bartholomew, despite the decimation of their aristocratic leadership, joined with many moderate Catholics, some genuinely horrified by the savagery and lawlessness of Saint-Bartholomew, some for the sake of their own personal interests, amongst whom the most prominent were the king’s own brother and heir to the throne, François d’Alençon, and the governor of Languedoc, Henry de Montmorency-Damville. Alençon and Damville published each a declaration, explaining their decision to go to war and the goals they intended to achieve<sup>30</sup>. In his declaration, issued on 13 November 1574 at Montpellier, Damville stated that “the loyal duty and fidelity in service of his majesty and for the good and peace of his subjects and of his kingdom determined us to take up arms against its oppressors and disturbers”<sup>31</sup>. The main idea of Damville’s text was that the kingdom was in danger because of an evil coterie of foreign courtiers who were deceiving the king: the struggle for religion was a mere pretext, used by this coterie to oppress and despoil France. In order for an authentic peace to take hold (because one that allowed this coterie to keep

<sup>28</sup> Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars*, p. 87.

<sup>29</sup> Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 100.

<sup>30</sup> With regard to Damville and Alençon’s texts, see also Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, *Righteous Rebels: The Language of Peace and Justice in the Aristocratic Propaganda during the French Wars of Religion*, in Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, Ioan-Augustin Guriță, Sorin Grigoriță (eds.), *Power, Aristocracies and Propaganda: Forms of Legitimizing and Challenging Rulership in France and Moldavia (16th-17th Centuries)*, Konstanz, Hartung Gorre Verlag, 2023, p. 22-28.

<sup>31</sup> Cl. Devic, J. Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, Tome Douzième, Toulouse, Édouard Privat, 1889, p. 1105.

pursuing its designs was phony), these foreigners had to be removed. Alençon issued his declaration at Dreux, on 18 September 1575: just like his ally Damville, Alençon does not blame the king, but the same foreign advisers and the Guise clan, and states the same goal, to “remove the disturbers of the peace of the kingdom”<sup>32</sup>. However, Alençon goes further than Damville, because this removal is only a first step towards a general reform of the kingdom, which was to be achieved by the king in cooperation with the Estates General<sup>33</sup>. This text reflects the general conviction that had set in during the mid-1570s, that the king’s will alone was not sufficient anymore to impose peace upon the belligerents: according to this opinion, concord alone between Catholics and Protestants did not suffice and a thorough political reform of the French state was necessary if any peace was to last.

Henry III was forced by the strength of his enemies to sign the edict of Beaulieu in May 1576, the most favorable ever granted to the Huguenots during the wars of religion (but also to Alençon personally, whose appanage were massively increased by this peace). Despite disliking the conditions imposed on him at Beaulieu, Henry III came to agree in principle with the necessity of reform and of a *modus vivendi* with the Huguenots. The Peace of Beaulieu was cancelled by a catholic-dominated Estates General held at Blois (December 1576 – February 1577) and war broke out again, this time against the Huguenots abandoned by their previous Catholic allies. Due to lack of funds, the war fizzled quickly, with the treaty of Bergerac (14 September 1577), confirmed by the Edict of Poitiers (17 September 1577). Aware of the need to counter the unfavorable impression made by his lack of military exploits, Henry III distributed a lengthy justification, where “he stated that a suffering kingdom needed a just peace”; this peace “reflected his affection for his subjects, and it came from his heart”, having “only agreed to it after mature reflection, and in consideration of the good of the realm”<sup>34</sup>. In the preamble to the Edict of Poitiers, Henry III referred to the “intention to establish tranquility in this our Kingdom... and to return it to its former splendor and dignity”<sup>35</sup> — a statement not too dissimilar from others in the rebel propaganda, where the reform of the kingdom was always envisioned as some kind of return to a previous golden age. However, these peaceful desires came to naught. The collapse of Henry III’s personal authority in the last years of this reign meant that he had to yield to the pressure of the radical Catholics and pull back from his attempts at pacification.

<sup>32</sup> *Brieve remonstrance a la noblesse de France sur le fait de la Declaration de Monseigneur le Duc d’Alençon*, Paris, 1576, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 7-8.

<sup>34</sup> Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, p. 134-136.

<sup>35</sup> Gregory Champeaud, *The Edict of Poitiers and the Treaty of Nerac, or Two Steps towards the Edict of Nantes*, in “The Sixteenth Century Journal”, 32 (2), 2001, p. 324.



### **“No Peace with Heretics”: The Radical Catholic Position**

As none of the edicts of pacification prior to 1598 proved durable, the effects of this constant state of war was the degradation of the royal authority and of the social and economic situation of the kingdom, something that many contemporaries and the royal government itself were keenly aware of. The problem with the edicts of pacification was that they acknowledged *de facto* religious division, and that was something which large segments of the Catholic population was not prepared to accept. Megan Armstrong clearly explains the main hurdle to the policy of pacification envisioned by both the Valois monarchy and the Huguenot political leadership by pointing out that “religious division struck at the very heart of French identity” because “spiritual division made a lie of French claims to spiritual purity, and, just as devastatingly, it threatened the political unity of the French body”<sup>36</sup>. Consequently, many bitterly opposed a policy of pacification that abandoned the previous attempts at suppressing heresy, mostly on religious grounds. For them, a policy of toleration, even temporary, meant a betrayal against God: in their opinion, for making such an attempt, the king himself would become a perjurer, because he had promised in his coronation oath to extirpate heresy. As pointed out by Yves-Marie Bercé, “the essential components of the ceremony were the two oaths which the king swore to the bishops and to the people, and the anointing, which was administered by the Archbishop of Reims” and “in his oaths, the king swore to uphold the laws and liberties of the Church, to maintain peace and dispense justice among his people, and to defend the Christian faith”<sup>37</sup>. From the point of view of the Catholics, “Christian faith” obviously meant Roman-Catholicism, even though the Protestants would have argued that, by implementing a religious reformation of the Calvinist sort, the king was merely purging the Christian Church of the papal corruption.

In the sixteenth century, the faith of the king was also regarded as crucial for the well-being of his kingdom: most Catholics could simply not imagine a situation where a monarch would not try to impose his religious faith on his subjects, something that was bound to have calamitous spiritual consequences if that faith was heretical. The Protestant religious leaders, starting with Calvin, agreed with this opinion, hence their attempts to convert the king and the royal family, with the expectation that this would trigger a conversion of the whole of France to the Reformation. The monarchy undoubtedly felt the pressure of this scrutiny and their religious convictions were more than once cast into doubt, both during the reign of Charles IX and during that of Henry III: this was undoubtedly the reason both for the repeated statements of Charles IX that he was steadfast in his Catholic faith and for Henry III’s ostentatious displays of Catholic piety.

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<sup>36</sup> Megan C. Armstrong, *The Politics of Piety: Franciscan Preachers during the Wars of Religion, 1560-1600*, Rochester (NY), University of Rochester Press, 2004, p. 11.

<sup>37</sup> Yves-Marie Bercé, *The Birth of Absolutism: A History of France, 1598-1661*, translated by Richard Rex, Basingstoke, MacMillan Press, 1996, p. 39.

However, a policy of pacification involving even the temporary acceptance of two religions in France was so alien to the sixteenth-century mindset, that, as Penny Roberts correctly pointed out, it “was feared or hoped to be a first step on the path to a royal conversion” and for this reason all “edicts of pacification expressly forbade Reformed worship at court and in the capital city of Paris, so as not to encourage suspicion”<sup>38</sup>. During the reign of Charles IX, the most delicate moment of this sort came in 1561, immediately before the conference of Poissy, when the royal family itself seemed, to an outside observer, to lean towards the Reformation: avowed Protestant aristocrats like Jeanne d’Albret or Louis de Condé were received more than cordially by Catherine de Medici and no less a figure than Theodore Beza (Calvin’s right hand man and successor at the head of the Genevan Company of Pastors) preached openly at court. This was likely the moment when the Huguenots’ hopes were at their peak, undoubtedly envisioning a theological triumph in the debates planned to take place at Poissy. However, despite the fact that both the Huguenots and the Valois monarchy favored the idea of a national council finding a theological compromise and, thus, solving the religious differences at least in France, this was a possibility that many Catholics were fundamentally opposed to. In their view, it would have entailed the danger of a schism, because it could have come into conflict with the Council of Trent. In 1561, at Poissy, the superior general of the Jesuits and emissary of the pope, Diego Lainez, told Catherine de Medici that “the various parties should have put their case to the Council Fathers, and that she should not have permitted meddling in matters in which she had no authority”<sup>39</sup>. Once the council of Trent had concluded its deliberations in December 1563 and issued its final articles – despite the discontent of the Protestants, who refused to acknowledge its legitimacy, because, in their opinion, it had not been a “free” Council, but one under papal control –, for most Catholics the matter was settled. The Huguenots and the king might still talk about the possibility of another council, but that might involve a break with Rome and was, therefore, unacceptable.

During the reign of Charles IX, popular preachers carried out a fierce propaganda campaign against any accommodation with the Protestants. One of the most active was Simon Vigor, future archbishop of Narbonne, who built his argument on the monarch’s role as defender of the faith. While careful to avoid any seditious statement, Vigor could not evade pointing out that, if the king did not use his sword against the Huguenots, it might in the end be turned against him. As pointed out by Barbara Diefendorf, the main argument of Vigor’s sermons “rests on the familiar premise that heresy threatens not just individual salvation but the entire social order” and is based on the idea that “God will punish those who deviate from his teachings or allow such deviations to take place and His

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<sup>38</sup> Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars*, p. 80.

<sup>39</sup> Harro Höpfl, *Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 98.

punishment will be collective as well as individual”<sup>40</sup>. In a sermon on the theme of hypocrisy, Vigor argues that the edicts of pacification are anything but that: the name should not mislead the Catholic faithful, because evil goals are always hidden under noble pretenses. The claim of fighting for the public good (a statement which clearly alludes to the Huguenot propaganda of the day) often masks nefarious intentions and a so-called “edict of pacification” can, in reality, be “evil”, “wretched and full of hypocrisy”<sup>41</sup>. The intent is clearly to discourage the king from undertaking any negotiations with the Huguenots, because, later in the same sermon, Vigor argues that the Huguenots were inherently seditious and untrustworthy. The Catholic propaganda in favor of war had received an unexpected gift in September 1567, when Condé and Coligny had tried to seize Charles IX and failed, an event that seriously damaged the credibility of the Huguenot claims of loyalty. For Vigor, that was the evidence he needed that the Huguenots wanted “to betray the king and cut his throat”, while hypocritically claiming that “rebellion was obedience and obedience rebellion”<sup>42</sup>. In another sermon, the same Vigor claims that “the true way of ruining the religion is to allow freedom of conscience”, which, in his opinion, is the door by which “atheism and blasphemy” will make their way into France: the consequences of such a decision will be bad for the kingdom, but also for those who introduced such measures, equated with “the misfortune and dishonor of Jesus Christ and His Church”<sup>43</sup>. Basically, from this perspective, a compromise with the Huguenots for the sake of earthly peace would represent a spiritual rebellion against God, therefore, no true peace. Vigor and his fellow preachers feared that any concession to the Huguenots would lead to others and, thus, to a gradual erosion of the Catholic faith in France – “if they gained once an article, through the favour of the ‘moyenneurs’ and ‘politiques’ (...), they will not stop until they will have everything”<sup>44</sup>. Vigor was not entirely wrong in what concerned the intent of his Huguenot adversaries, because the religious wing of the Protestant movement clearly hoped for exactly such an outcome. For Catholics like Vigor, “the edicts were favourable to the interests of the Huguenot minority” and “any concessions to the minority religion were generally seen by such individuals as corrosive to the Catholic faith, as well as to community relations and the wider welfare of the realm”, with the Huguenots being “demonized by a discourse that juxtaposed their disobedience and malice

<sup>40</sup> Barbara B. Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 153.

<sup>41</sup> Jean Christi, *Sermons catholiques pour tous les jours de Caresme et feries de Pasques, faits en l'Eglise S. Estienne du mont à Paris par feu de bonne mémoire maistre Simon Vigor, docteur en Theologie, n'agueres Archevesque de Narbonne & Predicateur du Roi*. Paris, Nicolas Chesneau, 1580, p. 6. The sermon took place on Ash Wednesday, certainly after September 1567, because Vigor mentions the “surprise of Meaux”, a Huguenot attempt to seize Charles IX, which occurred at the end of that month.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 7.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 382.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 384.

with the loyalty and piety of Catholics, and so justified their ruthless repression”<sup>45</sup>. And the opposition to the edicts of pacification did not come just from popular preachers, but also from profoundly royalist institutions like the Parlements, which would have been expected to give their wholehearted support to the royal policy. The Parlements represented a paradox of this period, because it is from their milieu that some of the most prominent Catholic moderates emerged, but, on the other hand, they often tried to obstruct the policy of conciliation. This opposition manifested itself from the very beginning, attracting both the ire of the Huguenots, who saw in the Parlements one of their main enemies, and of the king, who was, obviously, not fond of seeing his policies questioned. The registration of the edicts of pacification often occurred only after significant pressure from the Crown and accompanied by other provisos: such was the case, for instance, in 1563, when, asked to register the peace of Amboise, which ended the first war of religion, the magistrates inserted a clause that limited the authority of the edict until the king reached his age of majority, when the matter was to be finally decided by a national council<sup>46</sup>.

There was one further aspect that worried the French Catholics attached to the monarchy. As already pointed out, the Catholics accused the Huguenots of seditious intent, an accusation the monarchy totally agreed with during the reigns of Francis I and Henry II. From 1560 onwards, though, the monarchy vacillated between reiterating this accusation and accepting the Protestants’ professions of loyalty – depending on the state of the relations between the Crown and the Huguenots. However, within the Protestant movement, there was a potentiality for the development of anti-royalist constitutional theories, despite the efforts of their political leadership to suppress them. These trends, whose main feature was a right of resistance against, and even deposition of, tyrannical rulers, started to surface during the 1560s and peaked in the aftermath of Saint-Bartholomew: they proposed the notion of a contractual monarchy, where the power of the king was severely curtailed through an agreement between the king and the people. Such trends, which seemed revolutionary (in the negative sense of the term) for a sixteenth-century society infused at all levels with the utmost respect for kingship, seemed to vindicate the previous accusations of sedition directed against the Huguenots. As pointed out by Mack Holt, such suggestions “struck at the heart of the sacral foundations of the French monarchy and went a long way toward alienating many Catholic nobles further from any lasting peace”<sup>47</sup>. The question was whether the king could make peace with subjects who undermined his authority, by accepting their terms, and could his other loyal subjects abide by such an agreement? In practical terms, this was not something new: the previous history of France

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<sup>45</sup> Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars*, p. 117.

<sup>46</sup> Mack P. Holt, *The King in Parlement: The Problem of the Lit de Justice in Sixteenth-Century France*, in “The Historical Journal”, 31 (3) (1988), p. 518.

<sup>47</sup> Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 76.

provided many examples of such compromises, with the king forced to make concessions to feudal coalitions. However, even in such cases, the royal authority was not formally put into question to the extent the Huguenot resistance theorists did: there had been no suggestions that the king owed his authority to the people, who could ultimately dismiss him if necessary. An anonymous pamphlet from February 1568, during the second war of religion, reveals clearly how were the agreements with the Huguenots viewed, by arguing that “it was morally and tactically wrong to make any attempt to treat with the seditious rebels, who aimed at nothing else than the entire subversion and ruin of the state”; such an attempt “could only result in the king being despised and threatened: it would leave him in perennial danger from new seditious enterprises”<sup>48</sup>. There were plenty of Catholics who doubted the good faith of the Huguenots, despite their professions of loyalty or the Crown’s acceptance of them. For instance, Jean du Tillet, an official of the Parlement of Paris and a fierce opponent of the edicts of pacification, could see no reason why the king should treat with rebels and unbelievers, while in January 1581, the Parlement of Grenoble informed the king that they would not be publishing the latest edict as the Huguenots of the region had no intention of obeying it or of disarming<sup>49</sup>.

A turning point in the attitude of the Catholics came in 1576, when the Edict of Beaulieu was issued: confronted with a threatening coalition of Huguenots and discontented Catholic magnates, Henry III had to yield to their demands and, besides the concessions made to the rebellious nobles, he granted the Huguenots freedom of worship in all of France with the exception of Paris and the royal Court. For many Catholics, such concessions were unacceptable and looked like a return to the days of 1561, when a conversion of the royal family seemed possible. In such circumstances, the warnings of the preachers from the previous period started to transform into open talk of armed resistance against the royal edicts of pacification: the most obvious manifestation of the discontent and of the mistrust in Henry III’s capacity or willingness to act against heresy was the formation of the Catholic League in 1576. There were many similarities between the behaviour of the Huguenots and that of the new League: the latter still professed a formal deference towards the king, not being ready yet to turn its discontent into open attacks against Henry III, and mixed their religious concerns with political demands. For instance, the League called for “the restoration to the provinces and their estates of their ancient rights, pre-eminences, freedoms, and liberties such as they were in the time of King Clovis”<sup>50</sup>. However, despite its formal declaration of obedience, the League spelled trouble for Henry III, because it clearly intended to tie the king’s hands with respect to his religious policy: for the League, there could be only one recognized religion in France, Catholicism, and they viewed the restoration of peace within the kingdom as depending on the restoration of

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<sup>48</sup> Barbara Diefendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>49</sup> Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars*, p. 118.

<sup>50</sup> Robert J. Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion, 1559-1598*, Harlow, Pearson, 2010, p. 75.

religious unity. A just and durable peace could be achieved only through a religious war in the spirit of the crusades of old: an agreement with heretics could produce only a false peace, which was meaningless.

The peace of Beaulieu was the first disappointment that the radical Catholics experienced with respect to Henry III, but was not going to be the last. The erratic behavior of the king, in particular, puzzled his contemporaries and drew suspicions of duplicity, especially when contrasting his conciliatory policy towards the Huguenots with his extravagant displays of piety, which included frequent participations in religious processions: the king was accused of being a disciple of Machiavelli and his ostentatious Catholicism was treated as a mask<sup>51</sup>. There are also other aspects of Henry III's personality and policies that contributed to the rapid decay of his prestige and of the royal authority: the most important was the abandonment of the warrior-king persona in favor of a more intellectual and religiously-devoted image. As events proved it, this was a totally unsuitable image, especially in a warlike period like the second half of the sixteenth century. After the peace of Bergerac, for instance, an anonymous pamphlet printed in Chartres claimed that "it was the peace of a military weakling, not man enough to have the courage of his convictions"<sup>52</sup>. The political crisis reached its breaking point in 1584, when the king's brother, François, died and Henry de Navarre became heir presumptive – a prospect utterly unacceptable for a large part of the Catholic population, noble or commoner. The League, which had faded away after 1577, was quickly revitalized and completely rejected Henry III's vision of peace. On 31 March 1585, it issued the so-called declaration of Péronne, where it stated both its goals and its opinion of the conciliation with the Huguenots, which was worthless, "a peace in name only" that "had rather nourished the evil instead of extinguish it"<sup>53</sup>. If the Huguenots had their own doubts about the religious legitimacy of a confessional compromise, despite the practical benefits for their community, the dissatisfaction of radical Catholics could have been only much greater, because they saw in such a peace the discredit of the Catholic faith, for no spiritual benefit whatsoever. The end of the bloodshed was, by itself, meaningless for a faction that regarded religious warfare, of the crusading type, as a positive good. Just as it was the case with the Huguenots, for the League an acceptable peace had to be a just one, but this justice is defined, first and foremost, in ultra-Catholic terms, namely, "the reintegration of the Church of God in its dignity"<sup>54</sup>, which obviously meant suppression of heresy by any means necessary. The final result of the degradation

<sup>51</sup> For an excellent analysis of the anti-royalist texts which approached this theme, of Henry III as a deceitful king, only feigning to be a Catholic but instead consorting with heretics, see David A. Bell, *Unmasking a King: The Political Uses of Popular Literature under the French Catholic League, 1588-89*, in "The Sixteenth Century Journal", 20 (3) (1989), p. 371-386.

<sup>52</sup> Mark Greengrass, *op. cit.*, p. 134-136.

<sup>53</sup> Simon Goulart, *Mémoires de la Ligue, contenant les événements les plus remarquables depuis 1576, jusqu'à la paix accordée entre le roi de France & le roi d'Espagne, en 1598. Nouvelle édition, revue, corrigée, & augmentée de notes critiques & historiques*, Vol. I, Amsterdam, 1758, p. 56.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 60.

of royal authority was the Treaty of Nemours from July 1585, which the Catholic League imposed upon a reluctant Henry III: this abolished all previous edicts of pacification and forbade the practice of the Reformed faith in France, thus completely reversing the previous policy of conciliation<sup>55</sup>.

## Conclusions

It would be wrong to portray the entire Catholic population as being in opposition to the royal policy of conciliation. During the 1560s, but especially after 1572, after the shock of Saint-Bartholomew and with the prospect of a never-ending war, a number of Catholics defected from the radical line and accepted the idea of the restoration of peace based on a limited religious co-existence. They were derisively called by their opponents “politiques”, with the implication that they preferred political benefits to spiritual ones. Mack Holt points out that they never formed an organized group and that they were not in favor of a modern concept of reason of state or a permanent policy of toleration, seeking instead a peace settlement restoring the Huguenots to the Catholic faith<sup>56</sup>. However, Mack Holt’s assertion that the “politiques” did not place “the state above religious unity” is questionable, because there is clear evidence that they came to consider that preserving France took precedence over attempting to restore religious unity through warfare: in their view, this was a clear case of the remedy being worse than the disease. Such opinions were expressed from the beginning of the civil wars: the *Exhortation to the Princes*, a tract of 1561 that has been attributed to Etienne Pasquier, argued likewise, making the bold statement (something which the monarchy of Charles IX or Henry III never did, although it accepted the situation *de facto*) that the only solution “was to permit two churches within France, one Roman and the other Protestant”<sup>57</sup>. Such voices will only become louder with time.

The solution to the wars of religion, which the “politiques” came to adhere to, was described by Nancy Lyman Roelker as implying “both the recognition of a heretic, but legitimate, king in the person of Henry IV, without papal absolution if necessary, and the abandonment of the hitherto rock-bottom principle, ‘un roi, une foi’ in favor of coexistence between the sects, however distasteful, when it was imposed by a strong king as the indispensable means to domestic peace and national security”<sup>58</sup>. After the failures of Charles IX and Henry III, it was the turn of Henry IV (known as Henry de Navarre until 1589) to make the attempt and this time it ended in success, partly because of his personal qualities, but also because a large part of the conflictual energies had already been spent in three decades of warfare. Navarre tried to stress his role as peacemaker even before his ascension.

<sup>55</sup> For the Péronne declaration and Navarre’s reaction to it from 10 August 1585, see Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, *Righteous Rebels*, p. 28-34.

<sup>56</sup> Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion*, p. 171-172.

<sup>57</sup> R. J. Knecht, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>58</sup> Nancy Lyman Roelker, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

There is a clear continuity between the goals he proclaimed in his public declarations from 1580s and Condé's propaganda of the 1560s, manifested, in particular, through the repeated professions of loyalty towards the king and the accusations against the Guises. When the Treaty of Nemours pushed the Huguenots towards war in 1585, Henry de Navarre issued, before the start of the hostilities and together with his main associates, Henry de Condé (son of the Huguenot leader from the 1560s) and Henry de Montmorency-Damville, a justification on 10 August 1585: it indicated (as usual) the Guise clan as "disturbers of peace", whose goal of usurping the royal authority could be achieved only through the "confusion, ruin and dissipation of this state"<sup>59</sup>. According to the declaration, the previous edicts of pacification showed the way out of this incessant warfare and they had failed only because of the intrigues of the Guises and their associates<sup>60</sup>. A military solution to the religious differences was not only impractical, because of the damage such an attempt could cause to the kingdom, but also theologically unacceptable, because it intruded upon the domain of God, "who alone reigns over consciences", as only He could "work in the hearts of His subjects in order to reunify them and lead them to one religion"<sup>61</sup>.

On 14 July 1587, before the battle of Coutras (where he will win a resounding victory against a royal army led by the duke Anne de Joyeuse), Henry de Navarre issued a declaration where, besides the typical Huguenot goals (removal of the Guises from power, call of a general assembly in order to find a solution for the kingdom's troubles, relief of the people), he also proclaimed his intent to seek a durable peace – and he reiterated this proposal even after his victory, albeit to no avail<sup>62</sup>. In 1589, after the Leaguer rebellion against Henry III – which followed the murders at Blois of the main leaders of the League, the duke Henry de Guise and his brother, the cardinal de Guise –, Navarre's hopes came to fruition: the chance was there for his previous propaganda to become fact and for Navarre to confront his Catholic enemies with the king's support. A truce was signed on 3 April 1589 between Henry III and Navarre (who had been formally at war, previously), followed quickly by a formal alliance on 29 April. Navarre's public declarations during this period emphasized conciliation as a path to peace: anyone who forsook the League would be pardoned and it was suggested to the Huguenots that the alliance with the king would mean the restoration of the previous edicts of pacification, which could constitute a satisfying solution to their grievances<sup>63</sup>.

The assassination of Henry III on 1 August 1589 profoundly shocked the royalist opinion in France: despite the unpopularity of Henry III, this was an event

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<sup>59</sup> Simon Goulart, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem.* p. 184-188.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibidem.*, p. 185.

<sup>62</sup> N. M. Sutherland, *Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion 1572-1596*, Bristol and Portland, Elm Bank, 2002, p. 149-155.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem.*, p. 251-256.



without precedent in the history of Capetian dynasty. More so, the radicalism of a part of the League, which seemed to upend the existing social order in order to establish a popular theocracy, their willingness to accept the candidacy of the daughter of Philip II, in defiance of the principle of agnatic succession and French national sentiment, together with the depredations of the war, pushed the moderate elements of League to seek an agreement with Henry IV, thus embracing the “politique” position, on condition that Henry returned to the Catholic Church. The League had perceived this threat long before and their propaganda was full of vituperations against the “politiques”, presented as godless atheists. But the “politique” position was a concern for many Huguenots as well. Scott Manetsch correctly points out that if “Catholic and Protestant moderates found common ground, a peace might be brokered at the expense of those Reformed who remained faithful to the Confession of Faith and Discipline”, and “efforts to bridge the theological distance between the Protestants and Catholics might inadvertently provide justification for a royal abjuration, with disastrous political consequences”<sup>64</sup>.

Henry IV’s abjuration actually occurred on 25 July 1593 and, while it did not mean an immediate end of hostilities, it led to a gradual submission of the League, town by town and noble by noble, to the king: but, even in these circumstances, the former rebels were able to extract costly concessions from Henry IV as the price of their submissions. In particular, many Catholic towns managed to secure from the king formal promises that no Protestant worship was to be permitted within their walls. Peace was coming to France, but together with the elimination of any possibility for the Protestant faith to grow. The essence of the edict is accurately described by Mack Holt, who points out that “it provided the means for a peaceful coexistence between the two confessions, not by eliminating the boundaries between the two, but by clarifying and recognizing them”<sup>65</sup>.

### **Rebellion and Peace: The paths for conflict resolution in Huguenot and Catholic propaganda during the French Wars of Religion**

#### *Abstract*

*The second half of the sixteenth century saw France descend into civil war, after several decades of increasing religious tensions brought about by the Reformation. It was an outcome which traditional political thought dreaded, because internal union was one of the most prized features of a healthy political body. Civil war, the line went, was much worse than any other calamity which might befall a polity and threatened it with complete dissolution. Therefore, once France found itself in such a situation from 1562 onwards, one of the main issues in French political discourse became the restoration of internal peace:*

<sup>64</sup> Scott M. Manetsch, *Theodore Beza and the Quest for Peace in France, 1572-1598*, Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2000, p. 233.

<sup>65</sup> Mack P. Holt, *Religious Violence in Sixteenth-Century France: Moving beyond Pollution and Purification*, in “Past and Present”, 7 (2012) p. 72.

*all the parties involved in the conflict paid at least lip service to it, although each envisioned their own path in order to achieve this goal. For the radical Catholics, internal peace could not be divorced from religious unity, therefore, the Protestants had to be exterminated, chased out or brought back into the Catholic fold. A more moderate group of Catholics came to argue that this was not possible without doing irreparable damage to the country and that coexistence with Protestants had to be accepted at least temporarily, looking to the king to impose such a solution. Finally, the Protestants, who envisioned at the beginning of the wars the possibility of converting the whole France to the Reformation, came to embrace the second point of view, as well, under the pressure of political realities. This paper aims to analyze the discourse of peace in the propaganda issued during the French Wars of Religion, examining its main themes and how it unfolded over this period of more than thirty years.*

*Keywords: France; Wars of Religion; Huguenots; Catholics; Propaganda; Peace.*

## ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III <sup>a</sup> ediție, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L’Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Archiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
<i>„Arhiva”</i>	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei

ASRR	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
AȘUI	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași
ATS	= Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville
AUAIC	= Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
AUB	= Analele Universității „București”
BA	= <i>Biblioteca Ambrosiana</i> , Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
BAR	= Biblioteca Academiei Române
BArchB	= Bundesarchiv Berlin
BAR int. ser.	= British Archaeological Reports, International Series
BBRF	= Buletinul Bibliotecii Române din Freiburg
BCIR	= Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României
BCMI	= Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice
BCU-Iași	= Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași
BE	= Bulletin Epigraphique
BF	= Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam
BJ	= Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn
BMI	= Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice
BMIM	= București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
BNB	= Biblioteca Națională București
BNJ	= Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher
BOR	= Biserica Ortodoxă Română
BS	= Balkan Studies
BSNR	= Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române
ByzSlav	= Byzantinoslavica
CA	= Cercetări arheologice
CAI	= Caiete de Antropologie Istorică
CartNova	= <i>La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica</i> , Murcia
CB	= Cahiers balkaniques
CBI	= <i>Der römische Weihebezirk von Osterburken. Corpus des griechischen und lateinischer Beneficiärer – Inschriften des Römischen Reiches</i> , Stuttgart
CC	= Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)
CCAR	= Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București
CCh	= <i>Corpus Christianorum</i> , Turnhout
CChSG	= <i>Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca</i>
CCSL	= <i>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina</i> , Turnhout, Brepols
CDM	= <i>Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat</i> , București, vol. I-V; supl. I.
CDȚR	= <i>Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului</i> , București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006
Chiron	= Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971
CI	= Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)
CIL	= <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> , Berlin
CL	= Cercetări literare
CLRE	= <i>Consuls of the Later Roman Empire</i> , eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987
CN	= Cercetări Numismatice
CNA	= Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București
CSCO	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium</i> , Louvain
CSEA	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis</i> , Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
CSEL	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i> , Wien, De Gruyter
CSPAMI	= Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești
CT	= Columna lui Traian, București

<i>CTh</i>	= <i>Codex Theodosianus</i> . Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971
<i>Cv.L</i>	= Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)
„ <i>Dacia</i> ”, <i>N.S.</i>	= Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
DANIC	= Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale
DGAS	= Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
<i>DI</i>	= Diplomatarium Italicum
<i>DIR</i>	= <i>Documente privind istoria României</i>
<i>DIRRI</i>	= <i>Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență</i>
<i>DOP</i>	= Dumbarton Oaks Papers
<i>DTN</i>	= <i>Din trecutul nostru</i> , Chișinău
<i>DRH</i>	= <i>Documenta Romaniae Historica</i>
<i>EB</i>	= Études Balkaniques
<i>EBPB</i>	= Études byzantines et post-byzantines
<i>EDCS</i>	= <i>Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby</i> ( <a href="http://www.manfredclauss.de/">http://www.manfredclauss.de/</a> )
<i>EDR</i>	= <i>Epigraphic Database Roma</i> ( <a href="http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php">http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php</a> )
<i>EpigrAnat</i>	= <i>Epigraphica Anatolica</i> , Münster
<i>ERAsturias</i>	= F. Diego Santos, <i>Epigrafia Romana de Asturias</i> , Oviedo, 1959.
<i>EuGeSta</i>	= <i>Journal of Gender Studies in Antiquity</i>
<i>Gerión</i>	= <i>Gerión</i> . Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
<i>GB</i>	= Glasul Bisericii
<i>GCS</i>	= <i>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller</i> , Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
<i>GLK</i>	= <i>Grammatici Latini Keil</i>
<i>HEp</i>	= <i>Hispania Epigraphica</i> , Madrid
„ <i>Hierasus</i> ”	= <i>Hierasus</i> . Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
<i>HM</i>	= <i>Heraldica Moldaviae</i> , Chișinău
<i>HU</i>	= <i>Historia Urbana</i> , Sibiu
<i>HUI</i>	= <i>Historia Universitatis Iassiensis</i> , Iași
<i>IDR</i>	= <i>Inscripțiile din Dacia romană</i> , București-Paris
<i>IDRE</i>	= <i>Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie</i> , I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
<i>IGLN</i>	= <i>Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae</i> , Bordeaux
<i>IGLR</i>	= <i>Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România</i> , București, 1976
<i>ILLPecs</i>	= <i>Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften</i> , Pecs, 1991
<i>ILAlg</i>	= <i>Inscriptions latines d'Algérie</i> , Paris
<i>ILB</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae</i> , Sofia, 1989
<i>ILD</i>	= <i>Inscripții latine din Dacia</i> , București
<i>ILN</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones latines de Novae</i> , Poznań
<i>ILLPRON</i>	= <i>Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices</i> , Berlin, 1986
<i>ILS</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 1892
<i>IMS</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris</i> , Belgrad
<i>IN</i>	= „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
<i>ISM</i>	= <i>Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine</i> , București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
<i>JGO</i>	= <i>Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas</i>
<i>JL</i>	= <i>Junimea literară</i>
<i>JRS</i>	= <i>The Journal of Roman studies</i> , London
<i>LR</i>	= <i>Limba română</i>
<i>Lupa</i>	= <i>Ubi Erat Lupa</i> ( <a href="http://lupa.at/">http://lupa.at/</a> )

MA	= Memoria Antiquitatis, Piatra Neamț
MCA	= Materiale și cercetări arheologice
MEF	= <i>Moldova în epoca feudalismului</i> , vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
MEFRA	= <i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité</i> , Roma
MGH	= <i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi</i> , Berlin 1877-
MI	= Magazin istoric, București
MIM	= Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
MM	= Mitropolia Moldovei
MMS	= Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei
MN	= Muzeul Național, București
MO	= Mitropolia Olteniei
MOF	= Monitorul Oficial al României
Navarro	= M. Navarro Caballero, <i>Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'élite dans l'Hispanie romaine</i> , Bordeaux, 2017.
NBA	= <i>Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana</i> , Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum
NDPAC	= <i>Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane</i> , I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008
NEH	= <i>Nouvelles études d'histoire</i>
OI	= Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași
OPEL	= <i>Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum</i> , vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002
PG	= <i>Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca</i> , ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912
PIR	= <i>Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III</i> , editio altera, Berlin.
PLRE	= <i>Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire</i> , 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992
RA	= Revista arhivelor
RBAR	= Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București
RC	= Revista catolică
RdI	= Revista de istorie
REByz	= <i>Revue des Études Byzantines</i>
RER	= <i>Revue des études roumaines</i>
RESEE	= <i>Revue des études Sud-Est européennes</i>
RHP	= <i>Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften</i> , Viena
RHSEE	= <i>Revue historique de Sud-Est européen</i>
RI	= Revista istorică (ambele serii)
RIAF	= Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie
RIB	= <i>Roman Inscriptions of Britain</i> , Londra
RIM	= Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău
RIR	= Revista istorică română, București
RIS	= Revista de istorie socială, Iași
RITL	= Revista de istorie și teorie literară
RIU	= <i>Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns</i> , Budapesta
RJMH	= <i>The Romanian Journal of Modern History</i> , Iași
RM	= Revista muzeelor
RMD	= <i>Roman Military Diplomas</i> , Londra
RMM	= <i>Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums</i> , Mainz
RMM-MIA	= Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă
RMR	= Revista Medicală Română
RRH	= <i>Revue roumaine d'histoire</i>

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<i>RRHA</i>	= Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art
<i>RRHA-BA</i>	= Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts
<i>RSIAB</i>	= Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău
<i>Rsl</i>	= Romanoslavica
<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>SCh</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= <i>Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica</i> , Iași
<i>T&amp;MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde