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**Laurențiu Rădvan**

Facultatea de Istorie  
Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași  
B-dul Carol I 11,  
700506, Iași, România  
Tel.: 40-(0)232-20.12.74  
e-mail: [radvan@uaic.ro](mailto:radvan@uaic.ro)

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## CUPRINS

Ana Honcu, <i>Initiative édititaire des femmes dans les provinces de Dacie et Mésie Inférieure (I<sup>er</sup>-III<sup>e</sup> siècles apr. J.-C.)</i> .....	7
Lucrețiu Mihailescu-Bîrliba, <i>New data on the salt resources from Ocna Dejului-Sic-Cojocna-Gherla area in Roman Dacia</i> .....	19
Ioan-Aurel Pop, Alexandru Simon, <i>Moartea „ducelui Valahiei”: situația din Moldova în informațiile Casei de Habsburg din vara anului 1496</i> .....	27
Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, <i>Rebellion and Peace: The paths for conflict resolution in Huguenot and Catholic propaganda during the French Wars of Religion</i> .....	33
Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, <i>Mormintele Cantacuzinilor moldoveni (secolele XVII-XIX)</i> .....	55
Ștefan Lemny, <i>Istoria ca o poveste: Istoria Imperiului Otoman de Cantemir</i> .....	83
Petronel Zahariuc, <i>Contribuții la istoria familiei Balș în secolul al XVIII-lea – începutul secolului al XIX-lea, după testamente și foi de zestre</i> .....	95

\*\*\*

Ștefan S. Gorovei, <i>Heraldica teritorială – manifest de putere?</i> .....	123
Laurențiu Rădvan, <i>Din consecințele Regulamentului Organic: înființarea Eforiei orașului Iași și alegerea primilor săi membri</i> .....	139
Simion Câlția, <i>Practici științifice și norme sanitare în regulamentele Laboratorului comunal chimico-bacteriologic al Bucureștiului</i> .....	157
Claudiu-Lucian Topor, <i>Carsten Nielsen and his “controversial” agreements in Romania (1915). Files re-opened in Nazi Germany</i> .....	169
Iana Bălan, <i>Ofensiva Brusilov: catalizator al negocierilor și al intrării României în război? Câteva ipoteze istoriografice</i> .....	191

\*\*\*

Adrian Vițalaru, <i>Strategic interests and economic cooperation. The beginning of trade relations between Romania and Poland (1920-1921)</i> .....	207
Ionel Doctoru, <i>„Vrem Ambasadă la Paris!” – Demersurile autorităților române pentru modificarea statutului Legației din capitala Franței (1926)</i> .....	221
Daniela Popescu, <i>Educație, școli și propagandă în cadrul grupului etnic german din România (1940-1944)</i> .....	235
Vasile Ungureanu, <i>Le diplomate Alexandru Paleologu</i> .....	249
Ciprian Nițulescu, <i>Între stema regală și steaua roșie. Aspecte privind personalul diplomatic al României (1947-1952)</i> .....	263
Iulian Moga, <i>Mama Gabrieli, the contemporary confessor of Georgia</i> .....	297
Andi Mihalache, <i>Despre tăcere și noile abordări din studiile culturale</i> .....	311

\*\*\*

<i>Recenzii și note bibliografice</i> .....	339
<p>Alexandru Vulpe, <i>Protoistoria României</i>, ediție îngrijită de Radu Băjenaru, București, Editura Academiei Române, 2020, 308 p. (Bogdan-Ștefan Novac); Irina Nemțeanu, <i>Ipostaze ale locuirii comunităților evreiești din Moldova (1775-1930)</i>, București, Editura Simetria, 2022 (Tudor Gaiță); Andreea Pop, <i>Arhitectura de veci în România. Cimitire, mausolee, edificii funerare în spațiul extracarpatic (1830-1939)</i>, București, Editura Patrimonia, 2021, 224 p. (Ioan Grămadă); <i>Servitorii Statului: funcționari, funcții și funcționarism în România modernă (1830-1948)</i>, coord. Judit Pál, Vlad Popovici, Andrei Florin Sora, Cluj-Napoca, Mega, 2022, 452 p. (Dan-Alexandru Săvoaia); <i>Elita românească și itinerariile modernității. Omagiu Profesorului Mihai Cojocariu</i>, coord. Cristian Ploscaru, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2021, 555 p. (Ion Cârja); <i>Identitățile Chișinăului: Strada 31 August 1989</i>, coord. Sergiu Musteață, Alexandru Corduneanu, Chișinău, 2023, 249 p. (Mihai Anatolii Ciobanu); Paul Brummell, <i>Diplomatic Gifts. A History in Fifty Presents</i>, London, Hurst&amp;Company, 2022, 423 p. (Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu); James Stourton, <i>British Embassies. Their Diplomatic and Architectural History</i>, photographs by Luke White, London, Frances Lincoln Publishers, 2017, 352 p. (Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu); Norman Stone, <i>Primul Război Mondial. O scurtă istorie</i>, București, Editura Litera, 2023, 256 p. (Andrei Chirilă); Diana Preston, <i>Opt zile la Ialta. Cum au configurat Churchill, Roosevelt și Stalin lumea postbelică</i>, București, Editura RAO, 2022, 473 p. (Andreea Ioana Ursulescu).</p>	
<i>Abrevieri</i> .....	361

## Carsten Nielsen and his “controversial” agreements in Romania (1915). Files re-opened in Nazi Germany\*\*

### Grain wholesalers and gentlemen of fortune in the neutrality years

To the eyes of a less-informed observer, Romania in the neutrality years sometimes appeared most likely as a country transformed into a huge oriental bazaar. The place where all kinds of foreigners (some of dubious reputation) would suddenly arrive to make profitable deals. Many German merchants also crossed the borders looking for the goods that were the most precious in times of war<sup>1</sup>. Alexandru Marghiloman wrote in his “Note politice” (“Political Notes”) about a meeting with Hildebrandt and Roselius (two of the “cerealists” – grain wholesalers – active in the Romanian capital) who had donated the amount of 25,000 lei to the Red Cross. They told him on that occasion about the strange interdiction decreed by Costinescu (the finance minister) on the export of wheat and beans. The name of Tache Ionescu also appears in the conversation. Ionescu’s interlocutors believed that the minister’s sudden conversion from war rhetoric to armistice and neutrality was due to the mercantile interests of those close to him. Hildebrandt tells Marghiloman he had signed a high-value contract with a certain Cincu (a reference to one of the Cincu brothers, probably Nestor Cincu, prominent member of the Democratic Conservative Party, former prefect of Tecuci) for grain deliveries

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\* PhD in History, professor, Faculty of History, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași, Romania; claudiulucian@yahoo.com.

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<sup>1</sup> Germany’s Consul General in Bucharest (Hans Tjaben) wrote to the Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow on August 16/29, 1914: “Kindly communicate the following to the Reich Procurement Office, the Rehbein Hapag (correct spelling HAPAG: Hamburg-Amerikanische-Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft – our note): within 10 days we shall be able to buy 20 thousand wagons. Purchasing starts today. Through Mr. Roselius, 40 wagons of wheat have already been bought from Mr. Brătianu, and will be loaded next week. We shall first buy wheat, barley, corn from the important figures; likewise, we already have barges on the Danube loaded with grain, we shall pay later, when the operation is finished.” Sorin Cristescu (editor), *Ultimele 67 de zile din domnia regelui Carol I al României. Telegrame*, Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun, 2016, p. 103-104.

before December 5, 1914: 500 wagons of wheat worth 2000 lei each. If the wheat made it to Germany, the profit would be supplemented by another 1000 lei for each wagon. Of course, it wasn't just the grains that mattered. Sometimes they were only a front. Marghiloman noted that Hildebrandt had learned that Cincu's influence could be decisive in getting Take Ionescu to stop insisting in favour of war<sup>2</sup>. There were indeed many things for sale in Romania. Sometimes that included men's honour. Corruption had worked intensely on the moral fibre of a nation with old Levantine attachments. Some insiders ("foreign experts") knew well the true face of things, easily coming to think along lines such as this:

"With the refined senses thieves are usually graced with, these individuals noticed that we now have to work here with money, and that is why they think their time has come to fish in murky waters. There are the most diverse variants out there. The most handy is the following: compatriot N.N. comes to me to tell me in strict secrecy that he can control colonel X or section chief Y, who can have "a weighty influence", and this for "only" 50,000 Krone. For this he will do his best to ensure that our supplies reach their destination, that the war against Russia is prepared, etc., etc., etc. The honourable compatriot actually concludes a parity agreement with other honest Romanians, formerly of certain influence, and they share the loot, and I don't have to add that these gentlemen disappear with unimaginable speed. Another more dangerous variety of the same genus is bounty hunters. They are slightly more skilled. While those mentioned above come with the clumsy manoeuvres of unreliable promises, the latter really achieve a performance and find advantages in it. For instance: a man has beans or cereals. He undertakes to deliver them to our "brave" army if I make available to him enough money for bribes so that he can obtain the [authorisation to] export to the Monarchy. In order to prove his honour and altruism, he proposes that I, and not him, pay the amount for the bribe. He will thus tactfully keep quiet the fact that he bought a wagon of beans for 3500 (lei) and sold it to us for 6700 (lei). A third variant is quite specific. Thus, yesterday a compatriot came to me with the following proposal: he knows Romania like the back of his hand and knows what he needs to do so that the government finally intervenes actively on our side, he will achieve this result and will not claim any advance, either of trust or in money. Only after the declaration of war against Russia does he want to obtain the sum of 100,000 Krone as a reward. The man does nothing *de facto* and speculates thus: if things go well and Romania intervenes on our side, he will get 100,000 Krone – otherwise he loses nothing. Between these two characteristic groups, there are many varieties and genres, and a whole repertoire of sleight-of-hand tricks is being played"<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Alexandru Marghiloman, *Note politice*, volume I, editor Stelian Neagoe, Bucharest, Scripta, 1993. Note from 24 September/7 October 1914, p. 199-200.

<sup>3</sup> Haus-, Hof und Staatsarchiv (HHStA). HHStA\_PA\_Karton520\_Liasse XLVII. Czernin to Burián. Telegram from Bucharest, 19 February 1915. Gegenstand: Hinter den Kulissen.

Perhaps the directness of these words is surprising. It should not be, although they belong to Ottokar Czernin, a vivacious diplomat involved in baffling incidents. Credited with a dose of credibility, the quoted excerpt reveals in brief the way in which controversial businesses once flourished in Romania. In fact, Czernin’s “compatriot” plays the role of a “go-between” in a business smacking of corruption that usually also required bribing Romanian officials, without whom no advantages for the Central Powers side could be obtained. Whereas in the business sphere these advantages were usually tantamount with the preferential authorization of the export of grain and oil products, in political action they meant gathering a heap of promises. These ranged from discussing a major change in foreign policy to corrupting hostile journalists and tolerating contraband. The front used with patriotic pride by the “high Romanian dignitary” consists, of course, of invokes higher reasons: for example, the resumption of the import of armaments following the old German (or, as the case may be, Austro-Hungarian) channel that became inaccessible to Romania upon the declaration of neutrality. Practically, the “grains for weapons” exchange system is born from “reasons of state”, which proposed an attractive mechanism for speculative financial gains, bringing significant remuneration to the state officials. Ottokar Czernin, an experienced diplomat, placed the mentioned excerpt in the middle of a letter addressed to Stephan Burian, his boss at Ballplatz, the minister he was hesitantly trying to initiate into the news of the day. The letter dates from February 19, 1915.

### **Carsten Nielsen. From political police to business success**

Carsten Nielsen was born in 1873 into a peasant family in Hontrup (Huntrup) in Nordfriesland. After a period spent doing farmwork, followed by military training (he was a Hussar between 1888 and 1891), starting in 1898 Nielsen joined the Berlin police. Since he spoke Dutch well and understood some Scandinavian dialects, he was quickly recruited by the political police, for which he worked for a while, apparently with notable achievements. According to his own statements, he uncovered the English journalists who had obtained, by corrupt means, classified information about the German tariff projects. Appreciated for his hard work, he was promoted to the Criminal Police Department, the Banking and Commerce section. The right place for a devoted official to look into the activity of certain dangerous groups that were harming the financial interests of the state. In Krakow, for instance, he appears to have discovered the core of a Lombard society that used forged stamps in documents, causing serious damage to the Reich. In 1909 he decided, despite the accolades received, to leave the police and to devote himself to business. He managed in a few years to make a name for himself in the milieu of Berlin merchants, therefore it was not too difficult for him to get involved in more daring projects. He very quickly set up the Berlin-based Empire Savings and Loan Society (Reichs Spar und Rabatt Verein Berlin), which gathered several thousand

members in just a few months and aimed to support traders and businesses outside the trade union organizations controlled at the time by the socialists and by the social-democratic party. Soon he would start dealing with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt). In 1912 he bought from the Ministry of War the old Kaiser-Wilhelm Academy, located at the Friedrichstrasse station in Berlin, for the sum of 10 million marks. As the Balkan war broke out in the same year, the German banks ran out of liquidities. In order to pay his yearly instalment of 1.25 million marks, Nielsen agreed with the Foreign Office and the War Office to sell the property to a group of French financiers, who were to take over the entire management in August 1914. It seems (as things will show further) that Nielsen was not very lucky. The European war stifled most international business deals. All contact with foreign investor groups belonging to enemy powers was forbidden in Germany, so Nielsen reached an agreement with the War Ministry to freeze payments until the end of the war. As it will be shown later, the agreement was breached. In 1912 Nielsen founded the company *Handelsgesellschaft für Armee, Marine und Grossbetriebe*, with headquarters in Berlin and branches in Stockholm and Copenhagen, with bank deposits of approximately one million German marks. He was the director (Geschäftsführer) and sole owner of the shares. The Board of Directors also included some high-ranking military personnel, such as Lieutenant General Brandau, Vice Admiral Sass, Rear Admiral Sommerwerk. The object of the company was the direct purchase and intermediation of the purchases of items required by the Navy and the Army in times of war. The business prospered for a while benefiting from advantageous bank credits, and the company created trade opportunities for itself in the Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands, using the neutrality status. After the war, probably because of the accumulated debt, Carsten Nielsen went out of business, working for almost ten years (from 1923 to 1933) for the International Correspondence Office "The Dawes Way", the place where he successfully fought (according to his own notes) the so-called attempt at financially destructuring Germany in the years of hyperinflation that followed the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. But his heart remained set on the pre-war world. Especially on the profitable businesses, which had provided him earnings of 110,000 marks every year. After the signing of the peace treaty, he would have liked to re-establish in Germany an organization intended for the war economy, designed to facilitate the purchase of military equipment. Exuding importance, he often told the story of how the Ministry of the Interior urged him to once again put his personal relations in the service of his country. He probably would have complied with the patriotic call, but the ghosts of the past always stopped him: the details of his business dealings in Romania<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (PAAA). R 73712. Schadenersatzanspruch-Angelegenheit. Carsten Nielsen. / Auswärtiges Amt Berlin.



### **The commercial contract with the Ministry of War – from carnival of illusions to vanity fair**

From Carsten Nielsen's own notes, it appears that he spent almost six months in Romania, from October 1914 until March 1915. However, it is possible that the stay was longer than a year. During this time, he had the opportunity to meet all kinds of politicians, journalists and representatives of business interests. He was certainly well received. In a report sent to Zimmermann (undersecretary of state at the *Auswärtiges Amt*) in Berlin, he concludes, based on what he saw, that one could not find amongst Romanians any trace of hostility towards Germany. “The leading personalities of Romanian politics are fully convinced of the invincibility of the German army. If there were reports about a directly hostile attitude towards Germany on the part of the Romanian ministers, then they would be completely incorrect”<sup>5</sup>. Appearances were probably not deceiving him. Despite the messages that were hostile to the military coexistence, the leadership in Bucharest had remained open to a constructive approach in other areas of interest for Germany. On December 18/21, 1914, Carsten Nielsen finalized the closing of an advantageous commercial contract with the Romanian Ministry of War. The object of the deal was the supply of armaments, ammunition and other materials for the army, procured by his companies from neutral countries and intended for Romania, in return for the export of grain and fuels for the benefit of Germany and its allies. Payment for deliveries would be made in Romanian lei, no later than eight days after the arrival of the foreign supplies in Bucharest. However, as Nielsen had to pay for orders either in German marks or in Swedish kroner, the conversion of lei into foreign currency could cause losses due to exchange rate variations. That is why the contract provided for an important favourable clause for the Germans: the Romanian government reimbursed a fixed exchange rate difference (set at 7%) on the total value of the contract. After the signing of the documents by both contracting parties, Banca Română de Credit (the Romanian Credit and Loan Bank) with headquarters in Bucharest was designated as the financial institution authorized to transact the deposits. For the scrupulous fulfilment of commitments, the contractual parties also agreed on guarantees. The most important of them stipulated the deposit by Carsten Nielsen of the amount of 1,675,000 lei in the accounts of the Romanian Ministry of War. The amount would not be released to the supplier until after the complete liquidation of the contract. Also, for precautionary reasons in fulfilling the clauses, the document also provided for the imposition of late fees in case of delays. Should the supplier not make the deliveries by the indicated terms, the guarantee would be forfeited in proportion to the undelivered merchandise. In case of total non-execution of the contract, the mentioned guarantee would be confiscated in its entirety. Although

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<sup>5</sup> PAAA, R1870. Detailed report by Carsten Nielsen to Alfred Zimmerman. *Auswärtigen Amt*. Berlin, 14 mai 1915.

the European war was ongoing, Carsten Nielsen could not claim force majeure for the non-fulfilment of commitments, if the Romanian government did not deem it was a valid case of force majeure. The extension of the delivery term, stipulated in the contract, would be discussed only in the case of the mobilization (entry into the war) of Sweden, or if Romania expressed its agreement in this regard. Other important provisions involved the assignment of the contract. Nielsen could partially or totally assign the contracted supplies, as in the case of import and export rights, but remained responsible for the payment of the guarantee and of the amounts receivable for the proper execution of the contractual obligations. Very importantly, in the perspective of subsequent developments, any dispute could be settled only before the Ilfov Commercial Court<sup>6</sup>.

The commercial contract appears to have been signed with the tacit approval of the Diplomatic Legation of Germany in Bucharest. The negotiations and drafting would have taken place under the eyes of Baron von dem Bussche, the minister plenipotentiary. However, his official correspondence with decision-makers in Berlin discreetly avoids the topic. Carsten Nielsen is only sporadically mentioned at the time of the conclusion of the contract. If he is, it is important to remember the context. On February 23, 1915, an encrypted telegram (No. 245) sent from Berlin by Gottlieb von Jagow (state secretary at Ausw. Amt) arrived in Bucharest. The text of the telegram communicated the following: lately, Baron Burian appears to consent to Nielsen's proposal. Here (i.e. in Berlin) objections persist: 1) due of Nielsen's unreliability; 2) because the drafting of the document would not provide any absolute guarantee against indiscretion, on the contrary, it would only make it more difficult to testify; 3) it is easy to assume with certainty that Take (Take Ionescu, our note) will have concluded a similar agreement with Russia, therefore he is looking for a counter-insurance from our side in order to take advantage of both situations. He does not care which way the scales are tipped, and he wouldn't make any significant efforts in our favour. It is true, he would not do that for Russia, either. Is his influence strong enough, so that he can act decisively in the matter of Romania's intervention? The amount of 30 million appears in these circumstances far too high. I am of the opinion that it should be lowered to a value corresponding to the previous proposals<sup>7</sup>. Bussche replied to Jagow two days later, suggesting something else:

"I spoke with Negulescu<sup>8</sup>, I do not fully share your Excellency's doubts and once again recommend accepting the proposal; Nielsen is

<sup>6</sup> Romanian National Archives (ANR), file 11/1914. General Dumitru Iliescu.

<sup>7</sup> PAAA, R1866. Beitritt Rumäniens zu dem Bündnisvertrag zwischen Deutschland und Österreich. Vom 8. Februar 1915 bis 15 März 1915. Nr. 245. Jagow to Bussche. Encrypted telegram from Berlin. 23 February 1915.

<sup>8</sup> Paul Negulescu (b. January 12, 1874 – d. May 6, 1946), lawyer and honorary member of the Romanian Academy. Involved behind the scenes in signing the commercial contract and in other interesting business deals. Czernin describes him as follows: "A lawyer by training, he lives on Luigi Cazzavillan Street 22; a former deputy and senator, university professor, former magistrate, judge;

undoubtedly very astute, since all the influential decision-makers in the Ministry of War insist in his favour; I believe that we need not fear the danger of indiscretion, moreover, I have repeatedly discussed this very point with Nielsen, and he firmly assured me that indiscretion is completely out of the question; there is no obligation, according to Nielsen, towards the Russian side; regarding the attitude of the king and that of Brătianu, although both prefer to remain neutral for now, I consider it of great importance that any hindrances should be removed as much as possible from the way of a war against Russia which would place them in an uncomfortable opposition to public opinion; Brătianu fears the Takist faction; but he may be freed of this concern, once an immediate change begins to take place in the press after the cautious and determined signing of the document. Lowering the amount cannot be done, considering the numerous participants in the business. I kindly ask that no more time be lost for an immediate decision, my Austrian colleague is completely in agreement”<sup>9</sup>.

Ottokar Czernin – the Austrian colleague – had indeed consented. However, with the same perspective as Gottlieb von Jagow:

“It will not be possible to conclude a contract with Take Ionescu himself, because he is afraid of a trap and would not want to hand us a weapon. I believe that Take Ionescu, Negulescu and the Company will have concluded a similar deal with the Entente albeit a while ago; but now, as the events in the war theatre in the East show a change, they would like to cover their backs and ensure that they will definitely not be left empty-handed. The logical consequence of this is that the moment our victory becomes probable – and this will start being the belief here – they will come over with all their forces to our side because they do not in any way desire a lengthy neutrality. The fact that Nielsen would benefit, however, is inevitable”<sup>10</sup>.

Hard to say how much Nielsen stood to gain in this business. Only his suspected involvement in another major action to change Romania’s neutrality

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although he could have been appointed to the presidency of the Commercial Court, he retired from the Magistrate’s office. Protected by Constantin Disescu, former minister and one of the leaders of the Democratic Conservative Party, of which Negulescu himself is a member. He maintains close relations with both Disescu and Take Ionescu over whom he exerts considerable influence. Negulescu is viewed as very respectable and reliable in every respect, he has a good image in public life because he did not become involved in controversial deals. As a lawyer, he has sought only important matters, which came quite easy for him because he was quite wealthy and married rich. His wife, née Eliade, comes from a good family from Bucharest. Niculescu is also very close to General Iliescu and to the current Minister of Finance Costinescu. Both willingly listen to his advice and support him in every respect. Dmitri Negulescu’s brother is a university professor”. See, HHStA\_PA\_Karton5 20\_Liasse XLVII. Czernin to Burián. Telegram from Bucharest, 19 February 1915. Gegenstand: Hinter den Kulissen.

<sup>9</sup> PAAA, R 1866. Nr. 311. Bussche to Jagow. Encrypted telegram from Bucharest. 25 February 1915.

<sup>10</sup> HHStA\_PA\_Karton 520\_Liasse XLVII. HHStA\_PA\_Karton520\_Liasse XLVII. Czernin to Burián. Telegram from Bucharest, 19 February 1915. Gegenstand: Hinter den Kulissen.

policy remains certain: the commitment to corrupt the party led by Take Ionescu. The commercial contract with the Ministry of War actually served as a front for the deployment of the latter initiative. The Take Ionescu affair, however, required more discretion. However, it cannot be said that its details have remained a mystery to this day. Czernin had revealed some clues in the secret correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Carsten Nielsen was supposed to hold talks on behalf of the Wiener Länderbank and propose the following draft contract: "The aforementioned Bank will hereby guarantee that if within six weeks from the signing of this document Romania declares war on Russia or receives a declaration of war from her side and actually acts by force of arms against Russia, 10 million crowns will be paid within 24 hours of the outbreak of the war to Mr. Baron N (Nielsen) or to a person designated by him – another 10 million will be paid 12 days after the intervention in Russia and the last 10 million four weeks after the start of the war. (30 million in total). No receipt will be claimed for this payment. (Germany will pay half of the amount)"<sup>11</sup>. Czernin's secret correspondence also reveals that on February 16, 1915, Nielsen had already had a secret meeting with Take Ionescu. The latter appears to have told him that he agreed with all the conditions that Negulescu, his trusted man, who had led the negotiations until then, had communicated to him. The contract signed by the Länderbank had to be submitted by Nielsen to a specially designated third-party (Banca Română de Credit) and thus any evidence would have vanished in the event of an unwanted disclosure. The scenario of the hijacking of Romanian neutrality involves the creation of a border incident with Russian troops, conducted by the magic wand of General Dumitru Iliescu (the signatory of the commercial contract), an incident followed by a possible protest by the Russian military attaché in Bucharest, which would have provided the pretext for the start of hostilities<sup>12</sup>. Messages were exchanged, meetings were held. Negulescu met with Czernin outside Bucharest. In their conversation, Negulescu assured the Austrian plenipotentiary that Take's entire party would migrate to the Central Powers camp as soon as the contract was signed. As a juicy detail, Take Ionescu was to receive 25% of the total amount. (approximately 7.5 million Krone)<sup>13</sup>. Negulescu said he was prepared to travel to Berlin with Carsten Nielsen for Deutsche Bank to take a closer look at the document. It was also agreed that the bank vault would be a safer place to keep the documents. Nielsen, the middleman, would receive a key to the safe with secret contents<sup>14</sup>. It should also be added that the same Nielsen did not enjoy much appreciation in Czernin's eyes, but the conclusion of the deal could not be entrusted to anyone else. The Austrian plenipotentiary did not believe in the hypothesis of "winning over" the entire party of Take Ionescu for the sum of

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<sup>11</sup> HHStA\_PA\_Karton520\_Liasse XLVII. Nr. 205. Secret telegram, Ottokar Graf Czernin. Bucharest, 12 February 1915.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem. Nr. 224. Secret telegram, Ottokar Graf Czernin. Bucharest, 16 February 1915.

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem. Nr. 278. Secret telegram, Ottokar Graf Czernin. Bucharest, 25 February 1915.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem. Nr. 246. Secret telegram, Ottokar Graf Czernin. Bucharest, 19 February 1915.

30 million Krone. However, he himself had noted that in Romania “anything is possible”, therefore he sensed the potential of a change facilitated by means of corruption<sup>15</sup>. But these bold plans were shattered just when Nielsen least expected. The trade deal was the first to fall out of favour. The Auswärtige Amt sent Carsten Nielsen on 10 January 1915 the following notification:

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not agree to intervene in the conclusion of the contract and especially does not advise covering the payment of damages from private resources, as long as the analysis of the circumstances has not been completed. Nor is the assignment of the contract to a neutral power desired. In the event of the conclusion of the deal without its consent, the German government reserves the right to refuse the transit permit for the materials provided for in the contract on German territory, as well as the export permit for the materials purchased from Germany”<sup>16</sup>.

The commercial contract signed with the Ministry of War in Romania could not enter into force. The clauses became null and void in the absence of the consent of the German authorities, and Carsten Nielsen and his associates had reason to consider themselves wronged. The political deal (Take Ionescu) had to be concluded by the end of March 1915. However, Baron von dem Bussche never gave his consent. Nielsen and Negulescu were never sent to Berlin. All these angered Czernin, who considered that no one risked anything from the materialisation of the agreement. On the contrary, thinking of the fragile position of Austria-Hungary, he feared that agitations hostile to the Monarchy would intensify when the agitators felt that the business had abruptly fallen through. The conclusion of the political agreement had at least the advantage that it would have offered Austria-Hungary a much-needed minimum respite of a month. Busche, it seems, had not agreed<sup>17</sup>.

After the war ended, only time seemed to erase personal animosities. Relegated to the realm of interminable legal wrangling, uncomfortable political questions seemed to remain unnoticed by the wider public. Suddenly, however, a press article [*Rumänien Bundesgenosse oder Gegner?* Romania – alliance partner or enemy?] published at the beginning of January 1930 in the “*Deutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung*” newspaper rekindled an old controversy. After reading the content of the notes to the article, published by Count Max von Montgelas, and the comments of the former plenipotentiary in Bucharest, Baron von dem Bussche-Haddenhausen, Carsten Nielsen enters a risky speculations game. He angrily sends Bussche a letter in which he suggests that the answer to the question in the article (Romania – alliance partner or enemy?) lies in clarifying another dilemma: Why did

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem. Nr. 228. Secret telegram, Ottokar Graf Czernin. Bucharest, 17 February 1915.

<sup>16</sup> PAAA. R 73712. Schadenersatzanspruch-Angelegenheit. Carsten Nielsen. / Auswärtiges Amt Berlin. J. Nr. A. 1973/2024. Berlin, den 10. Januar 1915.

<sup>17</sup> HHStA\_PA\_Karton 520\_Liasse XLVII. Nr. 317. Secret telegram, Ottokar Graf Czernin. Bucharest, 4 March 1915.

the Carsten Nielsen deal fail? The conclusion of the letter still remains debatable for the search for the whole truth: “Would the question whether Romania is an ally or an enemy – wrote Nielsen – be of greater importance in the subsequent evolution of things that led to ruin, than the very events that took place in November 1918?”<sup>18</sup>.

### **Damages, claims and compensations – legal reverberations in the years following the war**

At the end of the first year of war in Europe, Romania had accumulated large quantities of grain for trade. Minister I. G. Duca noted that Brătianu had refused to consider offers from the Central Powers. He considered it a violation of neutrality to sell part of the surplus harvest to a country like Germany<sup>19</sup>. “We were doing everything we could to the detriment of the country’s immediate economic interests, in order to help our allies as much as possible”<sup>20</sup>. Foreign trade, however, stagnated because of the closure of the Straits and producers could no longer find storage places in the country. Export bans for an agricultural country like Romania could no longer be taken into consideration. A way out of the crisis had to be found. And the solution came from the Germans: they offered to buy up the available grain from the 1915 harvest<sup>21</sup>. The powers of the Entente still had the right of pre-emption. In July 1915, Aristide Blank wrote to David Lloyd George that if Britain did not urgently buy the Romanian grain, it would be sold to the Central Powers<sup>22</sup>. However, the Entente then declared itself unable to buy the stocks and agreed to start negotiations. The Romanian Government decided that grain should be sold only from state to state, at a price decreed by the ministers and with a number of carriages proportional to the harvest of each farmer<sup>23</sup>. An export commission was established. On October 13, 1915, the regulation on the functioning of the Central Commission for the Sale and Export of Cereals and Derivatives, based in Bucharest, was published in the Official Gazette (“Monitorul Oficial”)<sup>24</sup>. As President of the Commission had been appointed the Minister of Agriculture and Domains, Alexandru C. Constantinescu, and among the other members were Fotin Enescu and Dumitru Greceanu. This commission signed

<sup>18</sup> PAAA. R 73712. Schadenersatzanspruch-Angelegenheit. Carsten Nielsen. Auswärtiges Amt Berlin. Abschrift zu O 1208- IV /4 41527/ 6. Januar 1930. Seiner Excellenz Freiherrn von dem Bussche Haddenhausen.

<sup>19</sup> I. G. Duca, *Memorii*, volume I, *Neutralitatea*, Bucharest, Machiavelli, 2015, p. 292-293.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 293

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>22</sup> Sorin Aparaschivei, *Serviciul Britanic de Informații în România (1916-1950)*, Bucharest, Editura Militară, 2020, p. 35.

<sup>23</sup> I. G. Duca, *Memorii*, volume I, p. 293.

<sup>24</sup> This Commission populated by representatives of the Union of Agricultural Trade Unions set the available grain reserve, the maximum domestic price level and the minimum export tariff level, and the conditions for international transactions. See, Cristian Constantin, *Agricultura și comerțul cu cereale la Dunărea de Jos în anii Marelui Război (1914-1918)*, in *RI*, XXVII (2016), no. 5-6, p. 413-441 (here, p. 421).

important contracts with companies from Germany (Zentral-Einkaufsgesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, Berlin) represented by Dr. Carl Melchior, and from Austria and Hungary (Kriegsgetreide-Verkehrsanstalt Wien and Kriegsprodukten-Aktiengesellschaft Budapest), represented by Wilhelm Ritter von Ofenheim and Julius Klein, respectively. The contracts were signed on December 9/22, 1915 and March 8/21, 1916 respectively. For the Romanian side, they stipulated the obligation to supply important quantities of cereals and legumes by rail or through the Danube ports, but the deliveries depended on the evolution of the political situation. The purchasing companies from Germany and Austria-Hungary paid the Romanian state the amount of 50 million lei as down payment for the purchase of the quantities of cereals and legumes provided for in the contracts, but the requested quantities were never delivered as a result of the mobilization of the Romanian army and the declaration of the state of war. In February 1917, the companies from Austria-Hungary and Germany declared themselves injured parties in court and requested that the products of the W. J. Rohrbecke Nachvolger company from Vienna intended for the University of Bucharest, as well as the crates with laboratory items intended for the powder factory in Dudești (stored at Schenker Comp.) be seized until the recovery of the 50 million lei debt from the Romanian state<sup>25</sup>. Similar to his competitors that had concluded contracts with the Romanian state through delegates confirmed by the German plenipotentiary minister in Bucharest, Carsten Nielsen considered himself wronged due to the non-application of the clauses of the commercial contract. As such, he decided to fight with all his might, and went to court. He made his first claims in the fall of 1917, when he tried to use the presence of the German military administration in Romania (Militaerverwaltung in Rumaenien) to bring to court (Königliche Landgericht I Berlin) the Ministry of War of Romania, at the time in sheltering in Iași. He hired a lawyer (Dr. Hartwig Neumond) who formulated a complaint in which the emphasis was placed first on the petitioner's good faith, who was solvent and cooperative, and then on his full support from the German government. The gist of Nielsen's complaint that the only contractual party responsible for not fulfilling the contract clauses was the Romanian party. On March 5, 1915, the contract was applicable in all its points. The German side had honourably fulfilled its obligations. Also, the deposit in the amount of 1,675,000 would have been submitted to the Romanian beneficiary through Banca Românească de Credit, and the document contained the ratification signatures of the president of the Romanian Council of Ministers (Brătianu) and of the petitioner, Carsten Nielsen. It was at this moment, Nielsen's lawyer insists, that the procrastination of the Romanian government started. It appears that Brătianu no longer agreed with the content of the commercial contract due to the pressures of the Entente regarding Romania's entry into the war. On March 10, 1915, Ionel Brătianu informed Nielsen that

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<sup>25</sup> Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, collection 71-1914, E2, part II. Miscellaneous 1914-1924, vol 43 / The European war, the grain contracts with the Austro-German consortium, leaf 5-55.

certain agents of the Central Powers wished to use the contract in order to smuggle goods for Turkey on Romanian territory. The Romanian government could not implement the contract under these conditions. Brătianu also questioned the legitimacy of Nielsen as a representative of the interests of the German government, arguing his suspicion by invoking a counteroffer from the Krupp company, which had sent delegates to Bucharest, prepared to hold talks<sup>26</sup>. The lawyer, Dr. Neumond, portrayed before the court the statements of the Romanian Prime Minister as a ploy designed to avoid the application of the contractual clauses, thus bringing significant damages to his client. The disarticulation of Brătianu's "assumptions" resulted from the denials of the undersecretary of state von dem Bussche (former plenipotentiary in Bucharest) and from the testimony of the military attaché Major Bronsart von Schellendorf. According to Nielsen's notes, the reproaches of the Romanian prime minister continued in a less diplomatic tone. Brătianu allegedly accused the Germans that by this commercial contract they aimed to subordinate Romania to Austria-Hungary, economically and politically. Since the significant advantages belonged only to one of the belligerents and to a single friendly power, the deal exceeded the condition of observing strict neutrality. In the end, apparently annoyed and wanting to free himself of the burden, Ionel Brătianu allegedly told Nielsen that he no longer intended to honour the deal, because it had not been concluded between two governments anyway, but instead between one government (the Romanian one) and a private person (petitioner Nielsen). Based on a wealth of evidence, attached to the file, and following laborious calculations, Nielsen's lawyer accused the Romanian government of causing an individual damage of 88.300,000 lei (the equivalent of 66.225,000 German marks, to which 4% interest starting from January 1916 was added) together with court costs, said damage resulting from non-fulfilment of the clauses of the commercial contract. The plaintiff invited the defendant (who could request the appointment of an ex officio lawyer) to resolve the case in legal matters at the First District Court in Berlin, observing the dates and deadlines set by this court. The lawyer demanded that the delivered sentence be enforceable and the damage be recovered from the bank deposits made by the Romanian state in German banks, (information about the latter could be sought at

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<sup>26</sup> Ionel Brătianu (like his father) knew of course the significance of the Krupp factories. He had already paid a visit to Essen shortly before the start of the war. In a letter sent to Bucharest, the director of the company Friedr. Krupp (Dr Mühlen) recounted this event to Baron von dem Bussche. Zimmermann, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was also notified of the visit, sent a report to the German Minister for Trade and Crafts. This report shows that the head of the Romanian government appeared to want more than to buy armaments. Apparently, his aim was for the German financial market to remain open for the loans needed by Romania. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. I.H.A. Rep. 120 Ministerium für Handel u. Gewerbe, C XIII 15, Nr. 24 Bd., 16. Akten betreffend die Handels und Schifffahrtverhältnisse mit dem Königreiche Rumänien. A. 5297. Berlin, den 19. März 1914.



the *Auswärtige Amt*)<sup>27</sup>. The German court (Königliches Landgericht I) was forced to accept the complaint made by Nielsen’s lawyer because Romania was at the time under the occupation and administration of German troops. However, the profit opportunity discovered by lawyer Neumond was questionable from the start because, in international jurisprudence, any summons imposed unilaterally on the authority of a sovereign state through the courts of another sovereign state (even in circumstances of war) was subject to the effect of nullity, without an effective recognition of the final sentence. The German authorities did not provide Nielsen the expected support. After the end of the military occupation regime in Romania and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the complaints addressed to the Romanian government regarding old disputes from the war could no longer be legally resolved in favour of German citizens unless they invoked abusive confiscation of goods and properties. Given the circumstances, Carsten Nielsen was forced to change his strategy. The main culprit for the non-fulfilment of the contract and responsible for the consequences became the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More precisely, Nielsen now claimed that the Diplomatic Legation in Bucharest did not support the fulfilment of the contract clauses. On March 22, 1922, he sent a letter to *Auswärtige Amt*, eager to show his displeasure at the fact that the matter had not yet received a swift and discreet solution, either diplomatically or in legal matters. Nielsen insisted that the deal had been accepted by Baron von dem Bussche (the minister plenipotentiary) and negotiated in Bucharest with influential people, in the elite of politics at that time. Some of these personalities (prime minister Ionel Brătianu’s case) had meanwhile returned to the helm of the government and for this reason any complaint against the Romanian state would have disturbed Germany’s economic and political relations with the new Romania, serving the interests of the Entente countries. Based on the fact that Dr. Tjaben had an extensive experience in Romanian affairs, Carsten Nielsen suggested that the consul general in Bucharest be informed about the dangers the public debate of the whole affair posed for the Romanian government’s policy at that time<sup>28</sup>. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to Nielsen claiming that the only diplomatic way to resolve the dispute was the recognition of a contractual obligation by the Romanian government. This hypothesis, however, was in contradiction with Article 439 of the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade allied and associated governments (a category to which the Romanian government also belonged) from unilaterally bringing into question any kind of financial claim against Germany originating in the period before the signing of the document. The invoked article admitted only the states’ complaints based on public international

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<sup>27</sup> PAAA. R. 73712. Carsten Nielsen. Einschreiben an das Auswärtige Amt. Geheim. Berlin S.W. 61, den 19. Dezember 1921. Ausw. Amt III R 3055 eing. 20 Dez 1921. See, Anlage II. Abschrift. Klage des Direktors Carsten Nielsen gegen das Rumänische Kriegsministerium in Jassy Rumänien, Berlin, den 22. Oktober 1917.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem. Auswärtiges Amt IIb. Rum 38/9. Eing. 25. MRZ 1922. Geheim. Betr. IIIR 3055. Berlin S.W. 68, den 24. März 1922 Lindenstrasse 16.

law, but not the option of individuals raising private claims. Only states could initiate such a legal action. Nielsen's case had been interpreted as being of a strictly private nature, and thus the German authority could not undertake the assumption of international obligations<sup>29</sup>. However, taking note of the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Carsten Nielsen had also invoked certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (Article 260 II), stipulations by which the German government undertook to compensate citizens whose rights had been harmed in the war and to pay damages to petitioners who, due to the authorities assuming the obligations arising from article 439, gave up raising claims (regardless of the legal quality of origin) against other states, third parties, proven by documents dated prior to the signing of the peace treaty. I, too, am a citizen of the German Reich – Nielsen seemed to say – please let me know which competent authority I should address in this matter<sup>30</sup>. Practically from this moment on, Carsten Nielsen communicated to the German Foreign Ministry that it was becoming guilty in the case and at the same time responsible for the damage. On June 16, 1922, he sent a new letter to the Auswärtiges Amt, in which where he claimed that him taking on the task of mediating the deal occurred as a consequence of the commitment of the German government in supporting the initiative, a commitment that had been officially sent in writing to the Romanian government by the plenipotentiary in Bucharest, Baron von dem Bussche. Carsten Nielsen thus gave the impression that he would not have undertaken the mediation of the deal if he had learned at the time of signing the documents that the German government would not get involved in the diplomatic solution of any litigious issues that could have resulted from the interpretation of the agreement. He now stated that he would have never signed the document, nor would he have undertaken the necessary expenses to facilitate its signing without the endorsement of the German government. By recognizing Article 439 (Versailles), the Berlin government could no longer fulfil its old assumed obligations and thus became culpable for the civil consequences<sup>31</sup>. Carsten Nielsen proved to be unexpectedly prolific. For a long time he continued to send petitions and he demanded reparations from all the chancelleries that governed interwar Germany. The alleged damages increased gradually, eventually reaching the sum of 15 million marks. His petitions were usually accompanied by long memoranda in which the "historical" importance of the 1915 deal was showcased, the author invoking alleged occult interests originating from within Germany that allegedly worked against its implementation. The conclusions placed the entire burden of responsibility on the shoulders of the Auswärtige Amt (indirectly also on the Reichsminister der Finanzen, from where he expected a concrete answer for the payment of damages). Carsten Nielsen alleged that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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<sup>29</sup> Ibidem. Berlin, den Aprilie 1922. An Herrn Carsten Nielsen...

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem. Zum Schreiben vom 6. Mai 1922. J. Nr. IIb Rum. 389... Auswärtiges Amt II<sup>b</sup> Rum. 673 Eing. 18 Mai 1922.

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem. Auf das gefl. Schreiben vom 5.6. 22. An das Ausw. Amt Berlin, den 16. Juni 1922. Ausw Amt II<sup>b</sup> Rum 840. Eing. 20 juni 1922.

allowed certain financial interest groups and various intriguers in Berlin during the war to prevent the implementation of the clauses of the disputed agreement. His claims were systematically rejected by the German authorities, and he did not receive satisfaction either on the conclusion of a compromise agreement regarding the payment of compensations or on the settlement of the case in an arbitration court in the country. On October 24, 1923, the German government issued a new decree that prohibited the raising of compensatory claims against the German Empire if the origin of the claim was the war economy, the war administration or the political upheavals of the post-war period. Based on this decree, the authorities of the Weimar Republic (Reichsminister Finanzen/ Auswärtige Amt) informed Nielsen that they rejected his request to present the case before a national civil court and suggested that the dispute be settled by a ministerial commission of compensation for which he would have been better entitled to submit a written request<sup>32</sup>. At this point, the dispute seemed closed. Carsten Nielsen unsuccessfully challenged the content of the October 1923 decree, showing that it did not match the legal basis of the case. His only remaining means of settlement remained the surrender of legal rights to foreign creditors in order to obtain a verdict from the International Court of Justice. But this solution contravened the political interest. Germany had nothing to gain from negative exposure on the international stage. The suspense would soon return, however.

### **The Nielsen case at the end. Re-opened dispute in Nazi Germany**

With the change of political regime in interwar Germany and the seizure of power by the Nazi party, Carsten Nielsen felt that he had the opportunity to revive his compensatory claims. Suddenly he thought of writing to the Führer of the NSDAP, none other than the Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler. The event took place on January 18, 1934. The official petition requested the establishment of a commission (appointed by the Reichstag or Aussenpolitische Stelle des NSDAP) to analyze the circumstances that led to the non-fulfilment of the deal concluded by Carsten Nielsen with the Romanian government, as well as the negative consequences arising from this for all the parties. Hitler suddenly discovered that from the perspective of maintaining Romanian neutrality in 1915, the conclusion of the Nielsen deal had represented “a first-rate success” for Germany and had caused great concern to the Entente powers at the time. The application of the contractual clauses would have been of great benefit, both economically and politically, to Germany and Austria-Hungary. The document provided Sweden with the grain it needed during the war, and gave Denmark the unexpected opportunity to provide more industrial goods to Romania. For “unexplained” reasons, however, the German Kaiser’s government had decided not to comply with the obligations, so the implementation of the agreement failed miserably. Nielsen’s new petition again

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<sup>32</sup> Ibidem. C 1208. Der Reichsminister der Finanzen, Berlin, den 28. Mai 1930.

placed the blame on certain “financial and business interest circles” who, possessing influence at decision-making level, proposed to use the crisis situation of Germany during the war for “their own enrichment” (Selbstbereicherung) and for the exploitation (Auswucherung) of the people. If and how any foreign interest circles in Germany may have exerted any influence could only be found out from the analysis of the facts that had occurred. The profit of the commercial contract (with a declared total value of approximately 700 million gold marks) should have gone exclusively to the German people and to the Romanian contractors, instead of to the war profiteers. An equidistant examination of the matter would prove, the petition claimed, the fact that the deal, once implemented, would have helped Germany emerge victorious from the war, because it would have ensured in a timely fashion the required food supplies for the German people and the essential fuel for the army operations. By accepting Article 439 of the Treaty of Versailles (1918) the former leadership of the Reich had prevented a regular German citizen, who had negotiated the contract with the direct involvement of the government, from pursuing the legal effects through a claim under international law, and thereby the application of the Treaty of Versailles had caused damage to the associated contractors. This position should have been brought to the attention of the Hague Tribunal according to Article 304 of the Treaty of Versailles. But all the efforts undertaken in the ‘30s –Nielsen continued in his memorandum to Hitler – remained fruitless because the guilty circles still had an influential position in the leadership of the German state. As a good German, Carsten Nielsen had refused to bring the matter before the League of Nations, and because of the government of the “Marxist Social-Democrats”, who had done everything they could to prevent the recovery of the German people and had not understood that the rebirth of the nation could never be achieved without breaking free from the shackles of the “criminal treaty” (“Verbrechervertrag von Versailles”, 1918), the matter remained unsolved. All hopes now lay with the new leadership of Germany, which – as the end of the memoir states – respected the rights of every bona fide citizen and eradicated the pests that were either lurking in public life or living amongst the German community<sup>33</sup>. Petitions were also sent on the same day (January 18, 1934) to the Reich Minister, Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy in the party, as well as on February 14, 1934, to Section III of the Verbindungsstab NSDAP, the party’s governing body that ensured the liaison with the Reich ministries (also dubbed unofficially the chancellery of the party during the war). Section III of the Verbindungsstab NSDAP opened investigations and drafted a reply note on March 9, 1934. Signed by Councillor Busse, the investigation started from the content of the contract, showing that the signatory governments had raised from the start objections to the feasibility of the contract. During the investigation, it was established that Nielsen himself had paid the guarantee of approximately 2 million

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<sup>33</sup> Ibidem. Berlin SW. 11., d. 18. I. 34. An den Kanzler des Deutschen Reiches und Führer der NSDAP, Herrn Adolf Hitler.

francs in Romania for fulfilling the provisions of the contract. Although he had initially asked the German government to pay the value of this guarantee, the money had not been made available to him, because the authorities considered the contract to be phantasmagorical and unenforceable. The German diplomatic legation in Bucharest, which at the beginning considered it undesirable (“nicht wünschenswert”) to accept the deal, allegedly declared itself in favour of concluding the contract during the negotiations, hoping that in compensation the Romanian government would allow the transit of the 25 wagons with ammunition already stationed in Romania and heading for Turkey<sup>34</sup>. Of his own accord and before receiving instructions from Berlin, Baron von dem Bussche had given his prior consent to the conclusion of the contract. However, the diplomat’s formal approval came too late. In the meantime, the deal had been declared non-functional by the Romanian side, because Nielsen had not paid the deposit on time. The Auswärtige Amt decided categorically (as it had done at the beginning) against the release of the deposit amounts because there were concerns about Nielsen’s person. In the meantime, it was found out that he did not have a favourable reputation and that he was viewed as an initiator of projects for which he did not have enough financial power. His business in Romania had not been credited by anyone with a chance of success. The statements according to which Nielsen had already procured the guns, cartridges and a large part of the contracted horses from the Hungarian Ministry of Trade, respectively the artillery ammunition from Metallwaren und Maschinenfabrik Düsseldorf proved to be untrue. The Ministry of War also explicitly stated that it had not supported Nielsen by providing him with its own stockpiles of armaments, but only by granting export and transit permits. This explains why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to Nielsen on January 16, 1915 asking him not to interfere in the deal until the government’s analysis of the contractual relations was completed. But Nielsen once again ignored the advice he had received. At the end of January, he apparently went to Bucharest specifically to fulfil the deal. He was late even in responding to the mobilisation letter. On February 2, 1915, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegraphed the Diplomatic Agency in Bucharest asking it to abandon the Nielsen deal as it was worthless and even harmful to Germany’s interests. In a

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<sup>34</sup> The dispute over the transit of ammunition to Turkey began in the autumn of 1914 (before the government in Constantinople decided to enter the war) and continued long afterwards. The first impression was synonymous with the adoption of a hasty decision by the Romanian government, foreshadowing dissent between the finance minister (Costinescu) and Ion I. C. Brătianu. Costinescu firmly opposed the transit of Turkish ammunition, in response to the ban on the export of German armaments to Romania. The government’s decision was surprising. It was immediately found that a train (between 22 and 25 wagons) was stationed on Romanian territory. In order to defend himself against the accusations, Brătianu made it clear that he personally did not control the whole situation. In reality, however, as he would tell Poklewsky-Koziell, he himself opposed the transit of ammunition to Turkey (at the risk of entering the war), because he perfectly understood what services it would bring to Russia. Vadim Guzun (editor), *Intrarea României în Primul Război Mondial. Negocierile diplomatice în documente din arhivele ruse 1914-1916*, Cluj-Napoca, Argonaut, 2016; nr. 241. Secret telegram from the minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest to the minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 April/4 May 1916, p. 282-283.

letter dated April 3, 1915 sent to Nielsen, the minister plenipotentiary (Bussche) replied showing that it was true that he had committed before the Romanian government to fulfilment the commercial contract. From here on Nielsen only assumed that obscure financial circles had worked against the admission of the project. In this regard, no references were found in the ministry documents at the time of the investigation. The deal did not go through either because of the impossibility of concretizing its clauses, or because of the doubts over Nielsen's personality. Ambitious and combative, he had believed that he could obtain compensation from the German governments accused of complicity in the non-fulfilment of the clauses. To his great surprise, however, these claims were repeatedly rejected by the Ministry of Finance (the last time through an address dated August 27, 1931). At the end of the notes made by referent Busse, the investigation revealed that Nielsen's last petitions entrusted the cause to a judgment of a political nature, and that the German public had no obvious interest for such an approach<sup>35</sup>. Aware of the fact that he would not get satisfaction even from the chancellery of the Nazi Reich, Carsten Nielsen finally chose the path of a compromise with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On May 22, 1935, he submitted a last petition in which he requested the institution's cooperation. Nielsen was now trying to emphasize the great efforts made by him for 15 years in order to find an honourable settlement of the case by resorting to mediation in favour of German politics. All requests until then, the petition shows, were rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The last complaint, which requested the arbitration of a German court, had been refused under the pretext of applying the decree of October 24, 1923. Even under these adverse conditions, he decided not to abandon the path of having the dispute mediated. He therefore proposed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the solution of resorting to the arbitration of a commission made up of three representatives of the Reich and three of the injured parties. He suggested, however, that the chairman of the commission should be a personality coming from among German diplomats (Nielsen even suggested Baron Bussche). In the event of a tie, the final decision of the commission belonged exclusively to the chairman, and the decisions, once taken, would remain final (the case being declared closed). It is obvious that Nielsen was still passionately opposed to the solution of the Ministry of Finance (which had remained unchanged since the communiqué of May 28, 1930) to take the settlement of the dispute to a government compensation commission. Confronted again with the rejection of the proposal, he makes veiled threats about resorting to an international legal procedure by assigning the rights of representation to foreign associates<sup>36</sup>. The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 31, 1935, Ausw. Amt. Abteilung II Balk) remained unchanged. The

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<sup>35</sup> PAAA. R 73712. Schadenersatzanspruch-Angelegenheit. Carsten Nielsen. / Auswärtiges Amt Berlin. II Balk 216 R. Verbindungsstab NSDAP. Abteilung III. Herrn Legationsrat Busse, Berlin, W8, den 20. Februar 1934; Vermerk zu II Balk. 216 R 1, 2 und 3. Berlin, den 9. März 1934.

<sup>36</sup> Ibidem. Varsten Nielsen. Einschreiben. An das Auswärtige Am. Berlin, dem 20. Mai 1935. Balk 1204 R. Eing. 22 mai 1935.

case could not be referred to an international court without violating the decree of October 24, 1923. Moreover, this was also valid in the eventuality of the transfer of representation rights to foreign citizens<sup>37</sup>. It is certain that Nielsen did not accept this verdict. At the beginning of July 1935, he notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he was assigning the representation of his private interests to a group of foreign associates participating in the realization of the contract. He believed that his right to assignment was irrevocable since it had been entered into the contract<sup>38</sup>. The matter later came to the attention of the Office for Foreign Exchange Control (Reichsstelle für Devisenbewirtschaftung) to which Nielsen had addressed a request for an approval to sign over the compensatory rights (valued at DM 15 million) to a group of Swedish participants. Asked about the approach, the German Foreign Ministry ruled against the public debate and refused to bring the matter to the attention of an international court (foreign tribunal), since it affected the general interests of the German Reich<sup>39</sup>. On January 8, 1936, the Landesfinanzamt Berlin (Devisenstelle) complied with the requirements and rejected his request for the assignment of compensatory rights to foreign associates<sup>40</sup>. With all the doors closed to him, Nielsen was forced to accept the settlement of the compensation commission. Resigned, he addressed the Ministry of Finance, which forwarded his file to the Compensation Commission (Abgeltungskommission). After several postponements, on June 5, 1936, the final verdict finally arrived. The commission had decided to reject the petition<sup>41</sup>. Seventeen years of fruitless perseverance had passed. Nielsen received nothing.

## Epilogue

Reflecting on the Nielsen case today, we may be filled with indignation. And of course, feeling this way, that is projecting the character into contemporary ethical prejudices, we leave the field of historical objectivity for a while. We know well that historians shy away from passing moral judgments about people of the past, so we calmly admit that all we have left is the privilege of telling the story based on the interrogation of the sources. The frequent answer to the research questions will invariably be impersonal and unbiased. But even so, strictly idealistically speaking, we still remain disturbed. How was it possible for a cunning and mercantile character with dubious references in the eyes of the Germans to gain such sublime trust in the eyes of the Romanians? Carsten Nielsen had actually

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<sup>37</sup> Ibidem. Zu II Balk. 1204 R. Berlin, den 31 Mai 1935.

<sup>38</sup> Ibidem. Carsten Nielsen. Einschreiben. An das Auswärtige Amt, Berlin 1 Juli 1935. II Balk. 1204 R.

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem. Reichsstelle für Devisenbewirtschaftung. An das Auswärtige Amt. II Balk 3102 R. Eing. 30. Dezember 1935.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem. Der Präsident des Landesfinanzamts Berlin. Herrn Carsten Nielsen, Berlin den 6. Januar 1936.

<sup>41</sup> Ibidem. Der Reichsminister der Finanzen an das Auswärtige Amt. Schadenersatzanspruch Carsten-Nielsen. Berlin, 7. Mai 1936. Commission resolution in the document annex (Ref.i.V.L.R. Lorenz. zu Balk. 990 R, Berlin den 5. Juni 1936).

concluded a profitable deal with the Romanian decision-makers. He had made a politically vulnerable agreement, which the German officials timidly encouraged at first and, in the end, carefully analyzing the situation again, they deemed it unfeasible. The execution of the commercial contract depended on many political unknowns. The most important can be clearly highlighted in the context: the contradictory evolution of Romanian neutrality. These uncertainties were of intense concern to Berlin at the time of the withdrawal of the guarantee for the contract. Nielsen the merchant, however, was unable to understand that. On the other hand, in Romania, the contract appeared to be profitable (it guaranteed the export of over 300,000 wagons of grain!), but it remains to be researched in detail the ease with which Nielsen had managed to negotiate the exchange of ammunition for grain, reaching the top tiers of power in Romania. There were, of course, complicities. Even today, one of them remains puzzling: August Em. Dorwagen, the accounting director at the Crown Domain Administration, a controversial figure through whom the deal was negotiated. At least this is how Nielsen's accounts describe: "Through long and difficult negotiations with leading figures of the Romanian government, with the help of Mr. Dorwagen, I managed to get the contract signed and with this the German Empire was sheltered for a while from a declaration of war from Romania – a fact that was of great importance then for the leadership of the German army and politics – so that the favourable moment for Romania's entry of the into the war against us had passed, when the Russian army had penetrated as far as Premyszl"<sup>42</sup>. Probably few people today remember any concrete alternative to the strategic option of Romania entering the war. The discussion was conducted at all times in the realm of political advantages. We firmly believe that precisely because Brătianu's government diligently chose the most suitable moment in the summer of 1916. Unfortunately, we know just as well today that for the German enemy, the turning point in Romania's belligerent option was the siege of Przemyśl (the longest siege of the First World War), an episode of the war that ended with a heavy defeat for Austria-Hungary at the hands of the Russian attackers. Romania missed the opportunity in surprising fashion. The favourable moment had passed because it lacked motivational foundation.

### **Carsten Nielsen and his "controversial" agreements in Romania (1915). Files re-opened in Nazi Germany**

#### *Abstract*

*Neutrality-era Romania sometimes behaves like a transit country with the appearance of an oriental bazaar. The ideal place where all sorts of foreigners (some of dubious reputation) come to do noisy business. Eager traders who are eager to make a profit and are eager to*

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem. Carsten Nielsen. Einschreiben. An das Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, den 20 Mai 1935. See, Anlage II. Geheim-Bescheinigung.



*get their hands on the most precious commodities in wartime: food and fuel. They were selling, sadly, almost everything. Corruption had touched the moral fibre of a nation in search of its identity. The insiders were well aware of the situation when they wrote: “With the refined senses that usually distinguish thieves, these individuals have noticed that we now have to work with money here and therefore they think that their time has come to fish in troubled waters”. These words belong to Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary Ottokar Czernin. He recorded them in a report of February 1915 to the Foreign Minister. They show the involvement of Central Power diplomats in secret negotiations on trade arrangements that also concealed political desires in Romania at the time. In the economic sphere, these arrangements were aimed at obtaining the coveted export permits for grain and accepting the transit of munitions for the Ottoman Empire. There were, of course, possible political scenarios arising from the conclusion of the contracts. All were aimed at Romania’s entry into the war against Russia. The War Ministry held such discussions and even concluded a controversial trade treaty. Citing the need to ensure supplies of armaments and the import of ammunition on the old German (or Austro-Hungarian, as the case may be route, which had become inaccessible to Romania when neutrality in the war was proclaimed, the Romanian army chiefs sat down at the negotiating table. This is practically how the “grain for arms” exchange system was set up, a model of lucrative business justified by the superior interests of the state. The corrupt middlemen and officials in particular stood to gain. Many foreign traders were registered with the General Security, and at the time they were also known as grain traders. One of them, Carsten Nielsen, managed to rise to the top. He brokered the signing of a trade contract with the War Ministry which, once in force, would probably have secured Germany a benevolent neutrality from Romania. But this contract was never implemented. Carsten Nielsen suffered considerable damage. Always seeking justice in the interwar years, he created a legal dispute over financial compensation for losses resulting from the blocking of Romanian business. This legal dispute did not die out until the years of Nazi Germany. Nielsen drafted numerous petitions, some of which were even addressed to the German Foreign Ministry. The Communication analyses the contents of these documents and identifies information that sheds new light on the ‘alternatives’ to Romanian neutrality.*

*Keywords: Neutrality; First World War; grain trading; Romanian government; Nazi Germany.*

## ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III <sup>a</sup> ediție, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L’Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Archiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
<i>„Arhiva”</i>	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei

ASRR	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
AȘUI	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași
ATS	= Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville
AUAIC	= Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
AUB	= Analele Universității „București”
BA	= <i>Biblioteca Ambrosiana</i> , Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
BAR	= Biblioteca Academiei Române
BArchB	= Bundesarchiv Berlin
BAR int. ser.	= British Archaeological Reports, International Series
BBRF	= Buletinul Bibliotecii Române din Freiburg
BCIR	= Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României
BCMI	= Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice
BCU-Iași	= Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași
BE	= Bulletin Epigraphique
BF	= Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam
BJ	= Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn
BMI	= Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice
BMIM	= București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
BNB	= Biblioteca Națională București
BNJ	= Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher
BOR	= Biserica Ortodoxă Română
BS	= Balkan Studies
BSNR	= Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române
ByzSlav	= Byzantinoslavica
CA	= Cercetări arheologice
CAI	= Caiete de Antropologie Istorică
CartNova	= <i>La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica</i> , Murcia
CB	= Cahiers balkaniques
CBI	= <i>Der römische Weihebezirk von Osterburken. Corpus des griechischen und lateinischer Beneficiärer – Inschriften des Römischen Reiches</i> , Stuttgart
CC	= Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)
CCAR	= Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București
CCh	= <i>Corpus Christianorum</i> , Turnhout
CChSG	= <i>Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca</i>
CCSL	= <i>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina</i> , Turnhout, Brepols
CDM	= <i>Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat</i> , București, vol. I-V; supl. I.
CDȚR	= <i>Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului</i> , București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006
Chiron	= Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971
CI	= Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)
CIL	= <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> , Berlin
CL	= Cercetări literare
CLRE	= <i>Consuls of the Later Roman Empire</i> , eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987
CN	= Cercetări Numismatice
CNA	= Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București
CSCO	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium</i> , Louvain
CSEA	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis</i> , Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
CSEL	= <i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i> , Wien, De Gruyter
CSPAMI	= Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești
CT	= Columna lui Traian, București

<i>CTh</i>	= <i>Codex Theodosianus</i> . Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971
<i>Cv.L</i>	= Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)
„ <i>Dacia</i> ”, <i>N.S.</i>	= Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
DANIC	= Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale
DGAS	= Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
<i>DI</i>	= Diplomatarium Italicum
<i>DIR</i>	= <i>Documente privind istoria României</i>
<i>DIRRI</i>	= <i>Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență</i>
<i>DOP</i>	= Dumbarton Oaks Papers
<i>DTN</i>	= <i>Din trecutul nostru</i> , Chișinău
<i>DRH</i>	= <i>Documenta Romaniae Historica</i>
<i>EB</i>	= Études Balkaniques
<i>EBPB</i>	= Études byzantines et post-byzantines
<i>EDCS</i>	= <i>Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby</i> ( <a href="http://www.manfredclauss.de/">http://www.manfredclauss.de/</a> )
<i>EDR</i>	= <i>Epigraphic Database Roma</i> ( <a href="http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php">http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php</a> )
<i>EpigrAnat</i>	= <i>Epigraphica Anatolica</i> , Münster
<i>ERAsturias</i>	= F. Diego Santos, <i>Epigrafia Romana de Asturias</i> , Oviedo, 1959.
<i>EuGeSta</i>	= <i>Journal of Gender Studies in Antiquity</i>
Gerión	= Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
<i>GB</i>	= Glasul Bisericii
<i>GCS</i>	= <i>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller</i> , Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
<i>GLK</i>	= <i>Grammatici Latini Keil</i>
<i>HEp</i>	= <i>Hispania Epigraphica</i> , Madrid
„ <i>Hierasus</i> ”	= <i>Hierasus</i> . Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
<i>HM</i>	= <i>Heraldica Moldaviae</i> , Chișinău
<i>HU</i>	= <i>Historia Urbana</i> , Sibiu
<i>HUI</i>	= <i>Historia Universitatis Iassiensis</i> , Iași
<i>IDR</i>	= <i>Inscripțiile din Dacia romană</i> , București-Paris
<i>IDRE</i>	= <i>Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie</i> , I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
<i>IGLN</i>	= <i>Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae</i> , Bordeaux
<i>IGLR</i>	= <i>Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România</i> , București, 1976
<i>ILLPecs</i>	= <i>Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften</i> , Pecs, 1991
<i>ILAlg</i>	= <i>Inscriptions latines d'Algérie</i> , Paris
<i>ILB</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae</i> , Sofia, 1989
<i>ILD</i>	= <i>Inscripții latine din Dacia</i> , București
<i>ILN</i>	= <i>Inscriptions latines de Novae</i> , Poznań
<i>ILLPRON</i>	= <i>Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices</i> , Berlin, 1986
<i>ILS</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 1892
<i>IMS</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris</i> , Belgrad
<i>IN</i>	= „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
<i>ISM</i>	= <i>Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine</i> , București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
<i>JGO</i>	= <i>Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas</i>
<i>JL</i>	= <i>Junimea literară</i>
<i>JRS</i>	= <i>The Journal of Roman studies</i> , London
<i>LR</i>	= <i>Limba română</i>
<i>Lupa</i>	= <i>Ubi Erat Lupa</i> ( <a href="http://lupa.at/">http://lupa.at/</a> )

MA	= Memoria Antiquitatis, Piatra Neamț
MCA	= Materiale și cercetări arheologice
MEF	= <i>Moldova în epoca feudalismului</i> , vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
MEFRA	= <i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité</i> , Roma
MGH	= <i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi</i> , Berlin 1877-
MI	= Magazin istoric, București
MIM	= Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
MM	= Mitropolia Moldovei
MMS	= Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei
MN	= Muzeul Național, București
MO	= Mitropolia Olteniei
MOF	= Monitorul Oficial al României
Navarro	= M. Navarro Caballero, <i>Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'élite dans l'Hispanie romaine</i> , Bordeaux, 2017.
NBA	= <i>Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana</i> , Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum
NDPAC	= <i>Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane</i> , I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008
NEH	= Nouvelles études d'histoire
OI	= Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași
OPEL	= <i>Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum</i> , vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002
PG	= <i>Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca</i> , ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912
PIR	= <i>Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III</i> , editio altera, Berlin.
PLRE	= <i>Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire</i> , 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992
RA	= Revista arhivelor
RBAR	= Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București
RC	= Revista catolică
RdI	= Revista de istorie
REByz	= Revue des Études Byzantines
RER	= Revue des études roumaines
RESEE	= Revue des études Sud-Est européennes
RHP	= <i>Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften</i> , Viena
RHSEE	= Revue historique de Sud-Est européen
RI	= Revista istorică (ambele serii)
RIAF	= Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie
RIB	= <i>Roman Inscriptions of Britain</i> , Londra
RIM	= Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău
RIR	= Revista istorică română, București
RIS	= Revista de istorie socială, Iași
RITL	= Revista de istorie și teorie literară
RIU	= <i>Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns</i> , Budapesta
RJMH	= The Romanian Journal of Modern History, Iași
RM	= Revista muzeelor
RMD	= <i>Roman Military Diplomas</i> , Londra
RMM	= <i>Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums</i> , Mainz
RMM-MIA	= Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă
RMR	= Revista Medicală Română
RRH	= Revue roumaine d'histoire

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<i>RRHA</i>	= Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art
<i>RRHA-BA</i>	= Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts
<i>RSIAB</i>	= Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău
<i>Rsl</i>	= Romanoslavica
<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>SCh</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= <i>Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica</i> , Iași
<i>T&amp;MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde